

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

IN the recent output of theological literature an unusually large place has been occupied by studies in the life and teaching of Jesus, and even the problem of His person has attracted more than usual attention. In the newly published composite work, *The Lord of Life*, reviewed in another column, a 'fresh approach' to that problem is essayed, and the central study of the work, namely, 'A Christology in Modern Terms,' by Professor D. Miall EDWARDS, invites analysis and comment. By this contribution the value of the work as a whole must be judged.

Dr. EDWARDS begins with a consideration which every one must nowadays be ready to admit as true, namely, that the experience of Christ as Redeemer and Lord is prior to the formulation of Christological doctrine. And it should also be conceded that, given such an experience of Christ, it is natural and indeed inevitable that we should seek to formulate what appear to be its doctrinal implications. Not that a clear distinction may be drawn in this connexion between experience and doctrinal articulation; the doctrinal articulation reacts upon the experience itself, and indeed is part of it.

Passing from this point Dr. EDWARDS proceeds to emphasize the need of modern categories in the Christological statement. He affirms, for example, the unpsychological and unreal character, from the modern standpoint, of the Chalcedonian doctrine of 'two natures in one Person,' with its corollary

of Christ's 'impersonal human nature.' Our reconstruction of the doctrine of the Person of Christ must be in line, he says, with our modern understanding of personality in terms of consciousness, experience, will, rather than nature or substance, as conceived without psychological content. From which we may gather that the traditional approach to the Incarnation does not satisfy the authors of this work.

Dr. EDWARDS then seeks to handle the Christological problem at close quarters, beginning with the foundation principles of a systematic restatement. These are (1) *the Jesus of history*, whose character, teaching, personal life, and experience really counted for comparatively little in the traditional Christology, but which are for a modern Christology nothing less than the revelation or interpretation of God; (2) *His true and full humanity*, which formally was always an emphatic element in the creed, at least from Chalcedon onwards, but which practically tended more and more to become a dead letter; (3) *His unique relation to God*, through His filial consciousness and His sense of unique vocation in relation to the Kingdom of God. In short, what constitutes the Christological problem is the fact that in all ages Jesus has presented Himself to Christian experience and thought as, on the one hand, a human, historical personality, and, on the other, Divine in origin and quality. How can we make that real and intelligible to ourselves to-day?

The problem has two aspects, (1) the Trinitarian problem, or the relation of Christ to the Eternal Godhead, and (2) the Christological problem proper, or the relation of the Divine element to the human element in the Incarnate Christ.

(1) How then is Jesus Christ related to the God of the monotheistic faith? So Dr. EDWARDS states the first aspect of the problem of Christology, and it should be observed that at this point he simply accepts the testimony of Christian experience that 'the Christ-values are the ultimate values.' But he affirms that the orthodox formula of two, or rather three, 'hypostases' within the one Divine 'substance' is a mere verbal compromise, and points out that orthodoxy under such a formula keeps oscillating between the extremes of Tritheism and Sabellianism. And he urges that the Divinity of Christ should be stated, not in terms of 'substance' and 'hypostasis,' but in terms of ethical value, adding that moral categories are the highest we possess for the interpretation of the universe. 'When we assert that Christ is one with the Father in character and purpose, we have reached a point beyond which we cannot advance except by a leap into the abyss of an abstract and unknowable Absolute.'

'If it be asked whether the Divine element which became incarnate in Christ was personal in the pre-incarnate period, we would reply that it was in a sense eternally personal—for it was the Spirit of the eternal personal God—but not in the sense that it was *another* or second person side by side with the Father within the one Divine Being. It was not a person in our modern sense of being a distinct centre of self-consciousness and self-determination, as the historic Christ clearly was.' From which it appears that Dr. EDWARDS, and presumably also his coadjutors, are not in sympathy with the Pauline, Johannine, and traditional idea of the pre-existence of Christ.

(2) How are the Divine and human elements related to each other in the Incarnate Christ? Here again the orthodox doctrine comes under criticism, as reducing the union of the Divine and

human elements, conceived as disparate and mutually incompatible 'substances,' to a paradox. But, it is urged, is there an essential difference in kind (and not merely in degree) between God and man? Is the difference such as to make a union between them inconceivable, except by an act of 'sheer irrational omnipotence'?

The Bible postulates an essential affinity between God and man, in the sense at least that God is 'the ground and home of the highest human values.' Yet it must be allowed that this sense of affinity is ever balanced in religious experience by the sense of something unique and incommunicable in God, as the self-existent and the alone universal. We should not, however, like the ancient Greek philosophy in which the traditional Christology found a setting, overstress the difference between God and man. The Divine and the human types of experience are sufficiently akin to enable us to think of the same historic Person as at once Divine and human.

This is true on the ethical side; goodness and love are essentially the same in God and man. It is also true on the metaphysical side. 'There is an element of time in God's eternal life, and an element of eternity in man's temporal life. The Infinite and the finite are ever drawing towards each other; God communicating Himself to and craving for man; man craving for and capable of receiving God.'

The Incarnation may thus be conceived as the culmination of a double movement—the movement of God towards man and the movement of man towards God. But it is a progressive spiritual achievement, not a mechanical act complete from the first; an achievement which reached its climax at Calvary, at the very moment of apparent failure and defeat. It should be added that to speak of the union of the Divine and the human in Christ by no means rules out the presence in Him of a unique endowment as a Divine potentiality. But the 'given' must be appropriated by the conscious will before it becomes ourselves.

In thus indicating how the dualism of the Divine

and human 'natures' in Christ may be transcended, Dr. EDWARDS makes use of Dorner's theory of 'progressive incarnation' and at the same time would take a hint from the late Dr. Sanday's psychological theory of the Divinity of Christ, which finds the *locus* of Divinity in His subconsciousness. It may also be said that while Dr. EDWARDS has caught the spirit (and the language too) of much recent Christological statement, this 'fresh approach' is neither a novel and original 'approach,' nor is it more than an 'approach.'

During the turmoil of the General Election a lecture was delivered which at once commanded widespread attention, and which will be remembered and studied when the whole flood of political oratory is forgotten. The lecturer was Professor A. S. EDDINGTON, F.R.S., whose pre-eminence in the scientific world is undisputed, and his subject was *Science and the Unseen World* (Allen & Unwin ; 2s. 6d. net). Those who are familiar with Professor EDDINGTON's works, especially his recent Gifford Lectures, will not find here anything startlingly new, but they will be charmed afresh by the lucidity and beauty of his writing, the felicity of his illustrations, and above all by that breadth of view and large, ripe wisdom which are peculiarly his own.

Physical science cannot bring us into touch with ultimate reality. 'We have the same desire as of old to get to the bottom of things, but the ideal of what constitutes a scientific explanation has changed almost beyond recognition. And if to-day you ask a physicist what he has finally made out the æther or the electron to be, the answer will not be a description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels or anything concrete ; he will point instead to a number of symbols and a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand for? The mysterious reply is given that physics is indifferent to that ; it has no means of probing beneath the symbolism. . . . Far from attempting to dogmatize as to the nature of the reality thus symbolized, physics most strongly insists that its methods do not penetrate behind

the symbolism.' This, doubtless, has consistently been Professor EDDINGTON's own attitude, but many scientists have spoken in far different tones and have produced a far different impression on the common mind. The silence on Armistice Day, says Professor EDDINGTON, cannot be fully explained by physical laws. If you attempt that, you miss its whole significance. Or again, the subject-matter of physical science bears the same relation to the totality of things as the business man's balance sheet bears to his whole physical, moral, and social life. The physicist resents the intrusion of the name of God into his sphere just as a business man would object to entering the name of God as an asset in his balance sheet. That is all very well if the position is clearly understood and the limits of physical science acknowledged.

But if it be supposed that physical science deals with the whole realm of reality the error is fatal. It is as if the business man were to say, 'Nothing is of any value but what is entered in my balance sheet.' The scientist may say that he has no time to turn aside to dispel this error from the common mind. But it may be replied that he has not infrequently made claims which encouraged the error. Be that as it may, it is surely the task and privilege of the preacher to expound, enforce, and reiterate this elementary truth that physical science, on its own confession, renounces all claim to deal with the whole of reality. There are realms of being beyond its ken, realms where its methods of investigation are inapplicable.

This clears the way for a fresh start, while at the same time it delivers us from the error, not unknown in our time, of trying to base religion on scientific discovery. 'Briefly the position is this. We have learned that the exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to a concrete reality but to a shadow world of symbols, beneath which those methods are unadapted for penetrating. Feeling that there must be more behind, we return to our starting-point in human consciousness—the one centre where more might become known. There we find other stirrings, other revelations (true or false) than those

conditioned by the world of symbols. Are not these, too, of significance? We can only answer according to our conviction, for here reasoning fails us altogether. Reasoning leads us from premises to conclusion; it cannot start without premises. The premises for our reasoning about the visible universe, as well as our reasoning about the unseen world, are in the self-knowledge of mind.' This does not mean that every whim and fancy is to be received as indisputable truth, but we have an inner sense of values which guides us as to what is to be heeded. The scientist who in a mood of natural mysticism feels the glory of the sunset does not reproach himself for having lapsed in his devotion to truth. On the contrary, he would be deeply concerned if he found himself losing the power of entering into this kind of feeling. 'In short, our environment may and should mean something towards us which is not to be measured with the tools of the physicist or described with the metrical symbols of the mathematician. We cannot argue that because natural mysticism is universally admitted in some degree therefore religious mysticism must necessarily be admitted; but objections to religious mysticism lose their force if they can equally be turned against natural mysticism.'

We want an assurance that the soul, in reaching out to the unseen world, is not following an illusion. We want security that faith, and worship, and above all love, directed towards the environment of the spirit, are not spent in vain. In answer to this, Professor EDDINGTON conceives that the crucial question is not, 'Does God exist?' He does not attach great importance to academic arguments about the existence of God. At the most they give us the idea of a creative spirit behind phenomena, and lead to the same feelings of wonder and humility as the contemplation of Nature itself can give. 'Religion does not depend on the substitution of the word "God" for the word "Nature."' The crucial question is, 'Has God revealed Himself?'

At this point Professor EDDINGTON turns strangely aside from the fact of Christ. 'I will not speak here of the revelation in a life that was lived nine-

teen hundred years ago, for that perhaps is more closely connected with the historical feeling which, equally with the scientific feeling, claims a place in most men's outlook. I confine myself to the revelation implied in the indwelling of the Divine spirit in the mind of man.' We note this omission as indicating that there is a region of truth, perhaps the richest of all, which is here left unexplored. But, apart from that, the shining of the inner light illuminates the way to faith in a Personal God. 'I suppose every serious thinker is rather afraid of this term, which might seem to imply that he pictures the deity on a throne in the sky after the manner of mediæval painters. . . . I believe the thought that lies behind this reaction is unsound. It is, I think, of the very essence of the unseen world that the conception of personality should dominate it. Force, energy, dimensions belong to the world of symbols; it is out of such conceptions that we have built up the external world of physics. What other conceptions have we? After exhausting physical methods we returned to the innermost recesses of consciousness, to the voice that proclaims our personality; and from there we entered on a new outlook. We have to build the spiritual world out of symbols taken from our own personality, as we built the scientific world out of the symbols of the mathematician. I think, therefore, we are not wrong in embodying the significance of the spiritual world to ourselves in the feeling of a personal relationship, for our whole approach to it is bound up with those aspects of consciousness in which personality is centred.'

Has the Bible a satisfying explanation to give of the problem of suffering? That is an important question, not so much intellectually as practically, for it is the problem which is constantly raised in the mind of youth. Group discussions among students invariably see this question thrust forward, and it is usually felt to be an insoluble one. James Hinton wrote of 'the mystery of suffering,' and he seemed to express what is a widespread impression. But is it a mystery? Is there any mystery at all in it? It may be a bold thing to

say that there is no problem on which we have so much light. But let us see.

The one Book in the Bible that sets out to deal with the problem is Job. What has Job to contribute to our question? In the *Abingdon Bible Commentary*, just published, Professor W. F. LOFTHOUSE, who writes on the Book of Job, says there are five answers to the question: Why is evil allowed? One is Satan's, to test a goodness which may be only skin-deep. A second is the friends', to punish wickedness. A third is Job's, because God is unjust. A fourth is Elihu's, to educate and train. And a fifth, that of God Himself, to bring to man his ignorance. The first three may be set aside as not the writer's view. Is the last the real intention of the Book? That would mean that there is no answer to the question. The only real peace would lie in a vision of God's reality.

This does not seem satisfactory. Perhaps we get a truer idea of what the writer had in his mind if we stand back and look at the Book as a whole. What impression is made on us by the situation and the discussion? Is it not that here is a man suffering, and tested by suffering, yet enduring, and not only enduring but learning and being perfected by his experience? That is what is left on the mind by the Book as a whole. And this seems to mean that the contribution of Job to the problem is that suffering is a discipline meant to purify and uplift and educate the soul of man. If that be so, Job makes a definite addition to our knowledge. For, if that is not a final solution to the question why suffering is in the world, at least it is true so far as it goes. It is Browning's great doctrine, that man *needs* suffering, hardship, trouble, if he is to be a man. 'Then welcome each rebuff.'

But Job is only one voice. There is, in addition, the voice of traditional orthodoxy, heard in Proverbs, which says, 'suffering is to be accounted for by sin. It is the penalty of wrong-doing.' It was this orthodox doctrine that roused the protest uttered in Job. But is it not true, so far as it goes? A very great deal of the suffering in the world *is* due

to 'wrong-doing' in the broad sense. The world is built on the law of retribution. If we break a law of Nature we suffer for it. How much rheumatism is due to careless disobedience of the laws of health? And, going a step higher in the scale, to what is much of the misery and tragedy of human life due if not to the fact that men will not live within the barriers of moral law? All this is trite, but it is necessary to see that Hebrew orthodoxy, in asserting that suffering is due to wrong-doing, was accounting for most of the suffering in the world.

There are two other answers made by the Bible to our problem which must be taken into our view of the whole question. One is the Hope of Immortality, glimpsed in the Wisdom Psalms. There are inequalities in life which will be set right in a future state of existence. This seems at first sight a surrender of the whole question. But, on the contrary, is there not here also a part of the truth? If by 'life' is meant, not the few years, but life in the greatest sense, in the fullest sense, then 'God has for ever.' This existence is only the vestibule of life, a time of schooling, a probation, when we are learning to use our tools. Real life is beyond. And part of the schooling is found in the hardships, and even sufferings, of the present. And we must look to the end, the goal, to find an explanation of the meaning of conditions here.

But the highest reach of vision on our problem is found in the teaching of Second Isaiah, crowned by the Cross of Christ, that suffering is vicarious, that we suffer, or may suffer, for the good of others. This is true of much of the suffering in the world. Motherhood is the most notable example. Woman suffers that life may go on. Pioneers and explorers suffer that knowledge may be increased. The noblest and the best have suffered that some great gift may come to mankind. The Cross of Christ stands among all the crosses in the world, lifting them up into its own light and filling them with a profound and searching significance.

No one of these answers explains all suffering. But each of them explains some of it. And when

we bring them together, they do account for a great deal that, apart from them, would be dark. It is true that the question is, even so, not fully answered. There will always be mystery in God's universe just because it is God's. We do not presume to exhaust the meaning of any act or purpose of God.

But when we look at the vast amount of trouble in the world, not making light of it but seeing it with humble sympathy, we need not feel staggered or hopelessly perplexed. For on this problem at any rate the Bible has something to say that helps to lift the burden of our ignorance and perplexity.

Books that have influenced our Epoch.

Moberly's 'Atonement and Personality.'

BY THE REVEREND N. P. WILLIAMS, D.D., LADY MARGARET PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, AND CANON OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

'Jews ask for signs, and Greeks seek after wisdom : but we preach Christ crucified, unto Jews a stumblingblock, and unto Gentiles foolishness ; but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.'¹ 'I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.'² 'God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.'³ In such glowing words does St. Paul proclaim what (if we may judge by the general tenor of the speeches contained in the first part of the Acts of the Apostles) even the earliest Christian believers had not in the beginning completely realized—that the Cross of Jesus Christ is not a mere member of or detail in the Christian scheme, but the Christian scheme itself : the doctrine of the Atonement through the death of Christ *is* the gospel, containing as it does by implication and holding together all other truths of revelation. And what St. Paul was the first explicitly to assert has been vouched for by the experience of all ages and countries in which the flame of Christian life has burnt clear and bright. Wherever men's hearts have been moved to their depths by the thought of Christ, it has been by the thought of Him on the Cross. The lights, the rhythmical movements, the awful silences of the august drama of the Mass have no meaning, save in so far as the Mass is believed to be the showing forth before God and man of the mystery of the Saviour's death : the fervent preaching of the Salvationist, the thrill and tension of the crowded revivalist meeting, the sobs which rise from the penitent form, witness

to the power of the oft-repeated appeal to wash in the blood of the Lamb. In Christian experience, the picture of the Crucified, whether set forth in the pages of the evangelic narrative, in liturgical or plastic art, in impassioned oratory, or merely held in the focus of meditative imagination, speaks with a compelling directness to the heart, like solemn music ; and, as the heart, if left to itself and not troubled by the uninvited assistance of the head, can clearly grasp the transcendental meaning of some great work of Bach or Beethoven, so also the heart by itself can feel the self-evident truth of redemption through the blood of Christ, without being able to give any logical or reasoned account of its *modus operandi*. Yet the head, or the intellectual faculties, cannot be restrained from peering into the mystery, and striving to reduce it to a set intellectual form. It is part of the unique mysteriousness of the doctrine of the Atonement, or of the work of Christ, that it should be even less amenable to scholastic representation or construction than the doctrine of the Incarnation, or of the Person of Christ. It is not difficult to state what the 'Catholic' or 'orthodox' (in the technical sense of these terms) doctrine of the Person of Christ actually is, and though some versions of that doctrine may at different times and places seem to have become divorced from the deliveries of Scripture and reason, it has never developed any forms which are patently irrational or positively shocking to the moral consciousness. Whereas he would be a bold man who should endeavour to formulate the 'Catholic' doctrine of the Atonement in any words more precise than the Pauline 'Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures' ;

¹ 1 Co 1²² (R.V.). ² 1 Co 2² (R.V.). ³ Gal 9¹⁴.

and the monstrous shapes in which it has sometimes appeared, seeming to be a doctrine of a Divine fraud practised on the devil or of an insensate vengeance which reckons not whom it punishes so long as it can punish some one, are well known.

Even apart from such caricatures of the redeeming love of God, it has been felt by many that purely objective, transactional, and juridical theories of the mystery, which appear to make Atonement a Divine act wrought for and outside of, but not within, the individual, involve a debasingly mechanical view of God's operations, and do violence to the dignity of human nature, which, however fallen, is still the nature of personal beings, and demands that its wearers shall be treated as persons by a Personal Father and God. Some thinkers therefore, of whom Abaelard is generally taken as typical, have sought to cut the Gordian knot by purely subjective theories of Atonement, which find its essence in the subjectively purifying, refining, and exalting effect exercised upon the emotions and character of him who contemplates the Passion by the story of Christ's heroic obedience and martyrdom. Yet such a view fails to justify the transcendent uniqueness which Christian thought has always attributed to the death of Christ as the means of man's salvation (for, if His death was merely a peculiarly affecting instance of a good man suffering martyrdom for his convictions, the death of Socrates, or of SS. Perpetua and Felicitas, might be said to 'save' us in very much the same way). And, on the purely subjective view, the sacrificial and expiatory language of the Epistles must always appear to be a morbid exaggeration. If, therefore, the intellect is to be able to apprehend the mystery at all, however imperfectly, it needs a mediating conception, which will steer between the Scylla of immoral substitutionism and the Charybdis of pure subjectivism. The book which claims our attention in this article, *Atonement and Personality*, first published in 1901, contains the classical presentation of such a conception.

Its argument begins with a subtle analysis of the three cardinal conceptions which enter into any doctrine of Atonement, namely, those of Punishment, Penitence, and Forgiveness. The author observes that these three attitudes or activities as we know them are necessarily imperfect, owing to the limitations of human nature, and point beyond themselves to an ideal Punishment, an ideal Penitence, and an ideal Forgiveness. Ideal Punishment, such as we can conceive to be inflicted by omniscient justice, would be purely reformatory

and restorative: it would be designed solely in order that it might come to be accepted by the sinner as a means for purging base elements out of his character and enabling him to identify himself completely with the law of righteousness. It is not denied that punishment, even Divine punishment, may sometimes assume a purely retributive aspect; but this only happens when the sinner obstinately refuses to accept and welcome his punishment, and to be reformed: in such a case, the punishment continues, but now expends itself, uselessly as it were, in mere vengeance, and this in the eternal world is what is meant by hell. Nevertheless, punishment, in its native and proper sense, is an instrument for the production of penitence, which involves complete eradication of evil from the character, and complete self-identification with the good. But, as to have sinned, even once, infects the personality with a kind of ineradicable taint and destroys for ever the bloom of innocence, perfect penitence is never attainable by us: however poignant our sorrow, we are always conscious of a secret hankering after the repudiated sin; and hence is derived the first of Moberly's great paradoxes, that ideal penitence is only possible to the personally sinless. (How, in that case, it can be possible at all is a point which will be discussed later.) The last of the three fundamental concepts, Forgiveness, is closely connected with the foregoing. Forgiveness implies the forgiveness, that is the penitence, of the person forgiven: mere remission of penalty or ignoring of guilt, for no reason at all, would be immoral. The common usage of theologians, which makes justification (or forgiveness) precede, and act as the precedent condition of, sanctification, is explained as implying the proleptic, but by no means the fictional, character of such preliminary forgiveness.

These considerations establish the general position that a mediator between God and man is necessary, if man is to be forgiven by God at all. Only a Divine mediator can possess the perfect sinlessness which is the antecedent condition of ideal penitence: only a human mediator could possess the consciousness of sin necessary before the attitude of penitence could be taken up at all. These conditions are perfectly fulfilled in Jesus Christ, who is personally identical with God, and yet very Man. The second of the crucial paradoxes, if such they may be called, appears in the statement that Christ was 'inclusively, not generically, Man.' He was, that is to say, not a man, not an individual member of the *genus* 'man,' but Universal Humanity, the hypos-tatized class-concept of human nature. As such,

He is able to penetrate and indwell, to be immanent in and to act on behalf of, the myriads of individual sinful men in a way impossible to any discrete individual man. The Irenæan *recapitulatio* is thus made the foundation-stone of Moberly's soteriology.

We are thus led to the third cardinal paradox of the book, that which must for want of a better term be called (though Moberly himself has hesitations about the phrase) 'vicarious penitence.' A virtuous and affectionate friend or parent bears the shame and sorrow of his friend's or child's sin, and bears it all the more perfectly in proportion to his love for the sinner and power of sympathetic self-identification with him; and, in actual experience, the presence of a friend who will repent on behalf of the sinner is the most efficacious instrument of procuring the sinner's own repentance. Hence Christ's voluntary acceptance of the death of the Cross can be interpreted as an act of vicarious penitence, made possible for Him (a) by His perfect sinlessness, (b) by His inclusive identity with humanity as such, and (c) by His infinite power of sympathetic self-identification with the sins of mankind, which made Him in a real sense the vicarious sin-bearer, dimly presaged by the insight of the prophets and the ancient ritual of Levitical expiation.

We thus arrive at a view of the Atonement which is thoroughly 'objective,' and yet in no sense 'substitutionary.' The juridical or legalistic category was implicitly set aside at the beginning of the argument by the affirmation of the reformatory character of punishment, and the result of the discussion has been to build up in its place what may be called a 'therapeutic' or 'medicinal' category. We now have to inquire in what way our author conceives the benefits of Christ's 'vicarious penitence' to be imparted to redeemed men, or, in the familiar terminology, how His work 'for us' becomes His work 'in us.' The answer to this question is found in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, on which Moberly lays great stress, and which may be designated as the fourth key position of the whole construction. Chapter IX. contains a singularly acute analysis of human personality, which anticipates to a surprising degree the general picture of the soul given us by the 'New Psychology,' showing that personality as we know it in ourselves is inchoate, unfinished, and in process of evolving; and that it can only be achieved by means of dependence on a higher spirit. Such dependence upon, amounting almost to fusion with, the Spirit of the Incarnate is ex-

pressed in St. Paul's cry, 'I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me.' In and through the indwelling Christ, or the indwelling Spirit, the redeemed appropriate the perfect penitence of the Redeemer, which ceases to be merely 'vicarious' and becomes their own; they attain forgiveness, not through any fictitious imputation of a substitute's merits, but through the completion of their personalities 'in Christ.'

The question naturally arises, What is the relation of the indwelling Christ to the indwelling Spirit? — a question which has perplexed, and continues to perplex, many reflective Christians who are not theologians and have never heard of Moberly. If their identity is insisted upon, as a logical and uncompromising monotheism seems to require, are we not landed in Sabellianism? If, on the other hand, any degree of distinctness, even though but relative distinctness, is postulated, how are we to sift out their respective operations and activities, and what criterion have we for assigning some operations to the Second and others to the Third Person of the Holy Trinity? Doubtless the doctrine of the *Perichoresis*, or *Circuminsessio*, assures us that the latter question ought not to be raised, inasmuch as the activity of each of the Divine Persons involves and is interpenetrated by the activities of the other two; but the human reason, especially if informed as to the actual historic process whereby the Church doctrine of the Trinity was gradually hammered out, finds it difficult to make real to itself a doctrine of diversity of Persons which has not as its corollary one of diversity of operations. Some exposition of the mystery of Divine Tri-personality is therefore needed, in order to make the sanctifying operation of redemption intelligible; and this is provided in Chapter IX. We must confess, however, that this is somewhat disappointing, and that, eloquent and powerful as are Moberly's words about the Trinity in manifestation, or the 'economic Trinity,' he has, in the ultimate analysis, little that is intellectually helpful to say about the deeper mystery of the 'immanent Trinity,' the fundamental threefoldness of the Divine Being into which the threefoldness of its manifested working runs back. A chapter (X.) on the Church and the Sacraments in effect concludes the scheme; and here again we notice the same failure to grapple with the difficult question of the distinction between the indwelling Christ and the indwelling Spirit (*some* distinction there must be, else why a distinction of names?), and to explain why the gift of Confirmation should be identified specifically with the Spirit and that

of Holy Communion specifically with the Incarnate Christ.

Despite the weaknesses just mentioned, and one or two others which will be pointed out presently, *Atonement and Personality* was, and—despite the fact that nearly a generation has passed since its first publication—still is, a great book. We cannot, indeed, ascribe to Moberly the whole credit for the creation of the concept of 'vicarious penitence,' for that had been expounded before him by M'Leod Campbell; nor did the book produce a revolution in soteriological thought as did Anselm's *Cur Deus homo*, for its impact upon current theology was immediately blunted, as it were, by the late Dr. Rashdall's severe if appreciative critique, which is embalmed in the third volume of the *Journal of Theological Studies*. It is impossible not to feel that in some important respects it belongs to a world of thought which has passed away. As Dr. Rashdall notes, Moberly seems to assume that Adam was an historical individual; he has no doubt that the baptismal formula of Mt 28¹⁹ and the whole of the discourse matter in the Fourth Gospel can be relied upon as the Lord's *ipsissima verba*; he writes as though there never was a time when the Church was not in possession of the fully developed idea of the Trinity. The only avowed adherent whom he seems to have had is his son, Mr. W. H. Moberly, whose essay on the Atonement in 'Foundations' closely follows the lines of his thought. Nevertheless, *Atonement and Personality* performed an all-important work in stemming the tide of merely subjectivist soteriologies, or of mere 'moral influence' theories; and it is still the classical presentation of a view which may appeal to those who cannot be content with subjectivism, yet find the hypothesis of penal substitution repugnant to their moral sense.

The genius of Moberly is so closely akin to the prophetic, and the eloquence with which he writes is so instinct with devotional fervour and worshipping awe, that we are *a priori* disposed to treat the scheme of ideas set out in his book not as purporting to be a closely knit logical texture but rather as a series of impressionistic pictures portraying, so far as human language can portray, various aspects of the mystery of God's dealings through Christ with sinful mankind. This consideration disarms criticism in the ordinary sense, and leaves us only the right to complain, if complaint is justifiable at all, of a certain cloudiness and absence of desirable detail in some of the pictures. This applies most particularly to what is the pivotal

member of the whole scheme, the affirmation that Christ is 'not generically, but inclusively, Man.' Three ideas appear to lie, in blended form, behind this affirmation. The first is the idea that Christ was Man, not a man: that the subject in which His humanity inhered was not a human individual, but the hypostasis of the Eternal Logos. This idea is known to students of patristic thought as that of the *Enhypostasia*, and is associated with the name of Leontius of Byzantium. The second is the Philonian notion that the Logos is in some sense the hypostatized universal or Platonic Idea of humanity, the *Autoanthropos*: this idea is not the same as the first and does not necessarily follow from it; it is indeed not *in pari materia*. The third is the Pauline conception of the exalted Christ as the Second Adam, the ancestor of a new race, and the Head of the mystical Body which is the Church, 'the fulness of him who all in all is being fulfilled.' All these ideas are ingredients in Irenæus' conception of the 'Recapitulation' of humanity in Christ, which, as we have already pointed out, Moberly has revived; but the internal unification of this conception has hardly progressed farther in the writings of the twentieth-century Professor than in those of the second-century Gallican Bishop. If the Eternal Logos was even before the Incarnation the universal of humanity, what could the Incarnation mean, except the concentration of the universal in, or its perfect expression through, a particular? In the light of the Synoptic evidence as to our Lord's strongly marked temperamental characteristics, what can be meant by the statement that Jesus of Nazareth was 'not generically man,' or not 'a man'? If the 'inclusiveness' predicated of our Lord's humanity is meant to refer to the Church, His mystical Body, then at the moment of His Passion this 'inclusiveness' was only potential, and it is difficult to see how it could then and there have been the ground of His capacity for representative penitence. On the other hand, if it refers to the universal relation of the Eternal Logos as such to humanity, are we to conclude that a Christian philosophy is necessarily committed to the Platonic theory of 'Ideas' or hypostatized universals? These, and many other such questions, Moberly has left unsolved; but he has blazed a trail which others may follow. With the prophet's intuitive touch he has drawn aside part of the curtain which hides the depths of the mystery of redemption; but he himself has, perhaps, been blinded by the intensity of the glory so revealed.

Literature.

THE ABINGDON BIBLE COMMENTARY.

WHAT may be described as the American Peake has at length appeared after long and careful preparation. *The Abingdon Bible Commentary* (Abingdon Press; \$5.00) has been edited by Professor Eiselen of the Garrett Bible Institute, Professor Edwin Lewis of Drew University, and Dr. D. G. Downey, General Editor of the Abingdon Texts. We desire to pay the Abingdon Press a compliment in associating their work with 'Peake's Commentary,' for we on this side are sensible of the debt we owe to that admirable handbook. The Abingdon is planned on similar lines. It is, therefore, far more than a commentary. It contains many general articles: twelve on the Bible as a whole, fifteen on the Old Testament, and thirteen on the New Testament. Over three hundred and twenty pages out of fourteen hundred are occupied by these general articles. Among the articles on the Bible as a whole are one of twelve pages, with which the volume opens, on 'How to Study the Bible,' one on 'The Use of the Bible in Preaching' (by Dr. S. Parkes Cadman), one on 'The Place of the Bible in Religious Education,' as well as articles on 'The Land of Palestine,' and 'History of the Hebrew and the Jewish People.' There are many well-planned articles on the Old Testament, discussing its formation, its relation to archaeology, to science, and to criticism. There are special articles on the different groups of literature, two in particular by Professor A. R. Gordon on the Prophetic and Poetical Books. Professor McFadyen writes a valuable essay on Israel's Messianic Hope, and the important article on 'The Religion of Israel' has been entrusted to Dr. Wheeler Robinson.

In the New Testament section, Dr. G. H. Box discusses the Historical and Religious Backgrounds of the early Christian Movement, Professor James Moffatt describes the Formation of the New Testament, and Professor E. F. Scott deals with its transmission. Two subjects of supreme importance have been given to two English scholars—The Life of Christ to Dr. Joseph F. McFadyen, and The Life of St. Paul to Professor J. Vernon Bartlet. Two of the editors, Dr. Eiselen and Dr. Lewis, are responsible for several sound articles. It is enough to mention some of the names best known on this side to show how competent and authoritative the discussions on general topics are. Nothing of

importance is omitted, and if any point of contrast with our 'Peake' impresses one it is that the American editors have had an eye always to the value of their work not only for ministers but for teachers and indeed for the average layman. The layman's need for scholarly yet simple guidance on matters on which he craves light is constantly kept in mind. And this book has therefore a 'practical' side which will commend it to many Bible students. It is only fair to say that this practical aim is never pursued at the expense of scholarship.

The general articles are followed by a commentary on every book in the Bible. This part of the work seems to us extraordinarily well done. It is well planned and well executed. The text is taken section by section, and the commentary is given in a running paraphrase in which much scholarly exegesis is cunningly concealed. All difficult expressions are explained. We have dipped into the commentary here and there, both in the Old and the New Testament sections, and always with admiration for the skill and simplicity and satisfying completeness of the explanations. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine how it could be better done.

There are one or two matters of moment which ought to be mentioned. One is the theological standpoint. This may be described as a modified modernism, or perhaps a modernist orthodoxy. It is in general very much the position of Dr. Hastings' Dictionary. Another point is the Index. This must have involved immense and prolonged labour. But the Editors may well feel that the result amply repays the trouble taken, for this is one of the most useful features of the volume, the references and cross-references are so detailed. Again, the volume is equipped with a series of maps, an urgent necessity that is satisfactorily met. And finally, the whole make-up of the book is admirable. The type is beautifully clear, and the volume not too heavy to hold in the hand. Altogether the Editors and Publishers of this work have every reason to feel satisfied with what is a first-class achievement and one for which readers, lay and clerical, on both sides of the ocean, will feel increasingly grateful.

THE PSALMS.

Dr. Arthur S. Way has justly earned a great reputation as a skilful translator of Greek poetry,

but we gravely doubt whether that reputation will be enhanced by his *Verse Translation of the Psalms* (Epworth Press; 6s. net). Anything less like the Hebrew Psalter than some of his translations of the Psalms it would be difficult to imagine. Take, for example, his rendering of the simple words in 1⁸, 'whatsoever he doeth shall prosper.' It runs thus:

All his work prospers, till he hears the call
'Come hither!' of the Spirit and the Bride.

This rendering, which to an Old Testament reader would probably have been quite unintelligible, is due, of course, to the exigencies of the rhyme, which demands a counterpart to 'beside' and 'abide' in the first and second lines of the quatrain. Here, as in scores of other cases, the fine simplicity of the original is hopelessly lost. Other illustrations will be found in 30⁵, 'weeping may tarry for the night, but joy cometh in the morning,' which becomes

Sorrow may night-long haunt the breast with
tears of mourning,
But with the day-dawn shall be seen glad hope
returning;

or in 126³, where 'we are glad' becomes 'with thankful joy our bosoms swell'; or in the last line of Ps 100,

His truth is a sun piercing clouds overcasting
The world's generations, new light ever bringing.

Occasionally we come upon artificial compounds which are as far removed as possible from the naturalness of the Hebrew, such as 'peril-compassed prayer' (4³) or a 'temptation-resisting spirit' (51¹⁰). Delicacies, and even points of real importance, are sometimes missed, notably in Ps 29, where no attempt is made to reproduce the sevenfold 'voice of Jehovah.' Inattention to textual criticism results in some practically certain mis-translations; cf. 49⁷, 'not all their wealth a brother's life can save,' or 90¹¹ 'Who knows Thine anger's weight? *The less we fear Thee, The greater is Thy wrath.*' Though many types of metre are used in the translation, there is no indication in the rendering of Ps 19 of the very obvious change of metre at v. 7. While sometimes the parallelism which constitutes part of the charm of Hebrew poetry is missed (as in 119¹⁰⁵ where there is no 'light' to correspond to the 'lamp'), there are at other points additions, which, however, have the value of illuminating paraphrase, as 84¹¹ 'For the Lord is a sun to enlighten, a shield thy life to ward.'

Most of the psalms are wisely left without titles, while, curiously enough, in a few cases there are titles whose unwarranted definiteness could hardly fail to mislead the ignorant and unwary; e.g., Ps 45 is boldly described as an 'Ode on the marriage of Solomon with a daughter of the King of Tyre.'

Dr. Way has needlessly and enormously increased his difficulties by binding his translation to the fetters of rhyme. The spirit of Hebrew poetry is far more accurately caught by the reproduction of parallelism and rhythm; rhyme is a delusion and a snare. But it must be said that, considered simply as English poems, most of Dr. Way's translations are fine and some of them very fine. Many of them are, indeed, not in the very least like Hebrew; the keenest ear could detect little resemblance between the opening verse of the first psalm and these words:

A happy life—man's immemorial quest
For this hath one goal only; he is blest

Who turns with horror from the atheist's proof
Which makes belief in God a childish jest.

Here, as in Pss 49 and 139, is supreme mastery of Fitzgerald's famous stanza; but it is hardly the best medium for rendering the first psalm.

Sometimes, however, Dr. Way achieves a real and almost Hebraic simplicity, especially so in his rendering of Ps 15, and there are innumerable fine individual touches, which betray the cunning of the true poet, as in 71^{2f}.

His bow is bent, the keen shaft strains the cord,
And on the point rides death.

Here, too, is a lovely verse (103^{12f}.)—and there are not a few nearly as fine—

Far as the sunrise is from sunset parted,
So far hath He removed
Their sins from His beloved.

Like as a father still is tender-hearted
To babes he holdeth dear,

Wide His compassions are as seas uncharted
To man's repentant fear.

THE INCARNATION.

The Lord of Life (S.C.M.; 10s. net) is a composite work from the pens of members of the Swanwick Free Church Fellowship, which appears to be in many ways an outcome of the Student Christian Movement. The aim of the work is to provide a 'fresh approach' to the Incarnation. The discussion falls into four parts, entitled respectively

the Human Problem, Christ in the New Testament, Christ in Theology, and Christ To-Day.

In the first part, the Rev. John Lewis sounds the keynote of the book when he says that in a true Christology the primary concern should be the re-appropriation of New Testament experience, and that, when we have made that experience our own, we shall be led to the assumption that Jesus was God Incarnate. In this part there is also a paper by the Rev. G. E. Darlaston, in which man's need of a Deliverer is discussed in a psychological setting.

In the second part, Dr. A. T. Cadoux treats of the Historic Jesus, attempting an historical and psychological elucidation of His life and death; and this is followed by a treatment by the late Professor H. T. Andrews of the Christ of Apostolic Experience. This last is a well-written article, lucid and straightforward, and successfully outlines the different attempts made in the Apostolic Age to find the best formula for the interpretation of Jesus; and it concludes by saying that as the early Christians sought to find terms adequate to express their experience of Christ, so we should do the same in the language of our day.

That the Church's reflective witness to Christ has been far from uniform, while not compromising the reality of the underlying idea of a unique Incarnation of God in Christ, is well brought out in the third part of the work, to which Professor J. Vernon Bartlet is the sole contributor. Dr. Bartlet reviews the earlier Christologies, showing how the personality of Christ became largely lost in His Church as an institution; and then, coming to the Reformation and the modern Christologies, shows how Christ has been rediscovered as the accessible centre of His own gospel. Particularly useful is his account, short as it is, of recent Christologies.

But it is only with the fourth (and final) part of the work that we come really to grips with the problem of an approach to the Incarnation from a fresh and modern standpoint. The task of essaying a constructive presentation of the Christological problem is entrusted to Professor D. Miall Edwards. We analyse his statement in another column. After it comes an essay by the Rev. F. C. Bryan on Christ in Present Experience, another by the Rev. H. H. Farmer on Christ's Right to our Worship, and yet another by Mr. Malcolm Spencer on the Church's Witness to our Lord. These last essays, interesting and useful in themselves, do not so much illuminate the problem of the Incarnation as reaffirm the fact of it.

It should be added that the work, considered as

a whole, suffers from being of composite authorship; it is not only that there is overlapping of material, there is also lack of logical flow.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL.

The Making of the Christian Mind, by the Rev. G. G. Atkins, D.D. (Heinemann; 8s. 6d. net), is a book of real distinction. Its title gives little idea of its contents, which are historical rather than psychological. The writer's aim is to delineate and interpret 'the changing phases of the Christian ideal' as these have unfolded themselves during the Christian centuries. This amounts to writing a history of the Christian faith on a fresh and highly interesting plan. The various chapters tell how Christianity 'becomes a deliverance religion,' 'writes its creeds,' 'finds a church mind,' 'becomes the religious mind of society,' 'becomes an adventure in liberty,' 'becomes humanitarian.' The field traversed is so vast and the events and opinions described are so multitudinous that there is wide scope for controversy. But every reader must acknowledge the immense learning displayed, the writer's fairness of mind, his wide sympathy and balanced judgment. The style is clear and vigorous, and is manifestly the expression of a strong and ardent Christian mind. A sentence or two may give a taste of the quality of the book. 'I do not see why we should allow the stars to crowd us out of the universe, or allow the dimensions of space which contain them to dwarf us too much. After all, we are weighing and measuring the stars; they are not weighing and measuring us.' 'Christianity did what it did through the gradual leavening of the social mind and not through a social or humane programme clearly conceived and consistently followed. Such programmes are the peculiar creation of our own time. They represent society grown acutely self-conscious, and I wonder if society ever grows acutely self-conscious until it has also grown old and a little weary. A strong new society is very much more apt to act in vigorous and more or less unconsidered ways for present goods than to consider the far future or analyse its own motives.' Again, 'There is no saving alternative to the way of this present world, so the Christian mind maintains, save the way of Christ, and there are not wanting signs that this present world is beginning to feel the force of that contention. . . . It would seem as if the tides of certainty and authority have drawn back into the great deep, in order that the authority and truth of Jesus Christ might the more commandingly

possess the coasts of human life thus laid bare. As one tide has ebbed another tide is flooding in. The world's hope, the world's faith, the world's devotion have gathered about Jesus as never before. There is no land or race anywhere from which this tide is not setting in. This is not rhetoric, it is demonstrable fact.'

NATIONALITY.

A very able book on a live subject is *Nationality: Its Nature and Problems*, by Mr. Bernard Joseph, B.A., B.C.L., Ph.D., with a foreword by Mr. G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., F.B.A. (Allen & Unwin; 10s. 6d. net). Its keynote lies in the sentence 'Nationality is the necessary link between man and humanity.' Dr. Joseph repudiates cosmopolitanism, which is the negation of the distribution of society into nationalities and aims at the goal of one great world society of individuals. On the other hand, nationality (the writer contends) is a force beyond the control of man and a sentiment which is deeply rooted in human nature. For cosmopolitanism Dr. Joseph would substitute internationalism, which exists to foster the friendship of nations. Cosmopolitanism is a bloodless thing and falls to pieces as soon as it is tested, whereas nationalism, deeply rooted in our nature, is a stepping-stone to that richer humanity that will consist of a family of friendly nations.

That is the main thesis of the book. In working it out, the writer discusses the factors of nationality, race, language, religion, the homeland, tradition, literature, and the will to associate. He then proceeds to expound its historical sources, and its actual manifestations in existing nationalities. Finally, we have some satisfying chapters on the relation of nationality to the state, to other ideals, to patriotism and war. The examples of Poland and Britain show that nationality is wider than the state. On the other hand, it is difficult to follow the writer's apparent contention that the Jews are a nationality, in view of the fact that Jews fought against each other in the Great War for the states of which they were citizens.

Dr. Joseph's book is published in the series of 'Studies in Economics and Political Science,' and was originally submitted as a thesis for the doctorate of philosophy in London University. It is an exceedingly able, and at the same time a constantly interesting, essay on a great theme, very timely in an age which has for its greatest task the construction of a real international system.

M. Henri de Man, whose work on the 'Psychology of Socialism' is marked by so much good sense and sound moral feeling, delivered some time ago a series of lectures at the University of Frankfurt-on-the-Main dealing with the worker's attitude to his work and the causes that determined that attitude. These lectures were based on written reports of workers as to their own feelings about their daily work. They have now been translated and published under the title of *Joy in Work* (Allen & Unwin; 8s. 6d. net). They contain an extremely careful and detailed study of the impulses to joy in work and the various technical and social hindrances which inhibit and quench that joy. No one can read the book without gaining a clearer understanding of what the worker has to contend with, and a deeper sympathy with his aspirations. The writer has no desire merely to reduce the daily round of toil so that men 'would only cease to be working beasts in order to become pleasure-seeking beasts.' The main question is 'how to treat living human beings in such a way that their qualities will be enabled to develop as freely as possible in the way best calculated to promote their own happiness and the general welfare.' This is a problem which cannot be summed up under the catchword 'anti-capitalism.' 'There are other causes, deeper causes, rooted rather in industrialism than in capitalism, and the task of overcoming these would still face an industrial socialist society.'

We have received the second edition of John Dewey's Paul Carus Lectures, entitled *Experience and Nature* (Allen & Unwin; 12s. 6d. net). Several minor corrections have been made throughout the work, and the first chapter has been entirely recast and rewritten. New also, and very valuable, is the Preface, in which the argument to be developed is concisely and very clearly summarized. The philosophy of the author is—so he himself terms it—empirical naturalism. He believes that 'we can be genuinely naturalistic and yet maintain cherished values, provided they are critically clarified and reinforced. Only chaff goes, though perhaps the chaff had once been cherished.'

While we are not in agreement with the philosophical standpoint of the author, we recognize the ability with which he argues, and are specially grateful for the lucidity and intelligibility of his writing. He has kept in view all through not only the expert, but the reader of ordinary intelligence.

It is somewhat rare to find a philosopher writing

on a difficult subject in language that the ordinary man can understand. This unusual feat has been performed by Mr. W. T. Stace, whose last book 'The Philosophy of Hegel' was considered by the late Lord Haldane (himself the most unintelligible of writers!) to be the most thorough and complete exposition since Stirling's 'Secret of Hegel.' We emphasize this to enhance the present achievement, which is an essay in the field of æsthetics. Mr. Stace's book is called *The Meaning of Beauty: A Theory of Æsthetics* (Cayme Press; 6s. net).

The main point of the book is that the appreciation of beauty is cognitive, intellectual, and not intuitional. For the intuitional Mr. Stace has a hearty contempt. He identifies it with the allogical, the irrational. He admits that the appreciation of beauty is immediate, but all the same it is not an 'intuition' but an intellectual act, a combination of concept and percept, with the concept ultimately fused in the percept. It is really not fair to grind down many pages of clear thinking and writing into this unclear summary. Readers who are interested either in philosophy or æsthetics will find a really interesting discussion here of the point at which they meet, and need not fear that they will break their teeth on the bone the writer is picking.

In the introduction to *Disestablishment* (Macmillan; 4s. 6d. net) Dr. Herbert Hensley Henson, Lord Bishop of Durham, traces the history, as indicated in his previous publications, of his attitude towards the question of the disestablishment of the Church of England. Formerly a supporter of the Establishment, he has become, since the rejection by Parliament of the Prayer Book Measure, a convinced supporter of disestablishment. Only through disestablishment will the Church, as he believes, be in a position to assert its spiritual authority. Establishment is now become a restraint which no self-respecting Church can rightly endure.

The second part of the volume contains Bishop Henson's Charge at the Second Quadrennial Visitation of his Diocese, in which the above position was affirmed, but without any attempt to explain or justify the author's change of attitude towards the Establishment, of which he had actually been an ardent and eloquent advocate. In his Charge he discusses the 'inherent spiritual authority' of the Church of England, which has been virtually repudiated not only by the action of the House of Commons in rejecting the Prayer

Book Measure, but also by the refusal of clergymen to obey either the rubrics or the Bishops; he also discusses 'parochial ministry' with special reference to the history and problems of the Diocese of Durham.

The book, which concludes with three appendixes, is written with Bishop Henson's well-known vigour and clarity, and constitutes an illuminating commentary on the present position of the Church of England.

Professor A. S. Peake has followed up his stimulating discussion of 'The Achievement and Personality of Paul' by another, equally stimulating, of *Paul and the Jewish Christians* (Manchester University Press; 1s. 6d. net). All the relevant passages, notably Ac 15 and Gal 2¹⁻¹⁰, are lucidly treated in the light of the most recent discussions. While scholars are far enough from unanimity in their solution of the problems raised by the decree and the four prohibitions in Ac 15, Professor Peake's own conviction is that the text is correct, and that three of the prohibitions have definitely to do with forbidden forms of food. He discusses with much keenness the problems raised by the inclusion of Jews and Gentiles within the membership of the same Church. He does not believe that the breach between Paul and Peter resulting from their collision at Antioch was irreparable, or that Peter had visited the Galatian churches and initiated a campaign against Paul. He thinks better of both apostles than to assume an irreconcilable antagonism between them. The conclusion of the whole matter is that, but for the insight and courage of Paul, Christianity might have been fatally stranded in a backwater of Judaism. The Christian Church owes an everlasting debt to St. Paul.

In mediæval ages Jerusalem was regarded by many cartographers as the centre of the world. Their judgment may be disputed, except, perhaps, from a theological point of view, but Palestine, though insignificant in size and in other ways, is certainly becoming the most important archaeological centre. In *Palestine in General History*, being the Schweich Lectures of the British Academy for 1926 (Oxford University Press; 6s. net), we have three excellent scholarly chapters on the part played by Palestine in the history of surrounding nations. The book gives the secular background to the religious evolution of the land. The period 'Down to the Fall of Nineveh' is treated with clearness and accuracy by the Rev. Professor T. H.

Robinson, D.D. The unique importance of Israel in history is described, from the earliest days onward through the successive periods of Egyptian and Assyrian dominance. A second chapter, 'From the Fall of Nineveh to Titus,' by the Rev. J. W. Hunkin, B.D., M.C., O.B.E., depicts the national relations of Palestine under the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Ptolemies, the Seleucids, the Maccabean Priest-Princes, and finally the Romans. In the third chapter we have an excellent account of the desert cities of 'Petra and Palmyra,' by Professor F. C. Burkitt, D.D., F.B.A. The book is valuable to all Old Testament scholars for the light which it throws on the international relations of Israel. It is beautifully illustrated with fifteen plates, one being a map of Syria after the Egyptian monuments.

A second edition of *The Religion of Israel*, by Professor George A. Barton, Ph.D., D.D., LL.D., has been issued by the Oxford University Press (10s. 6d. net).

The Significance of Jesus, by the Rev. W. R. Maltby, D.D. (S.C.M.; 3s. net), contains four lectures delivered to students in Toronto, in which there is a most persuasive presentation of the Jesus of history after the manner made familiar by Dr. Glover. There are also the usual criticisms of the otherworldliness of the Fathers and of the unintelligibility of their theology, in contrast to which everything in the Gospels is simple and genial. While all this is beautiful and captivating, one feels that it can be overdone, and that the students of to-day need to be called on to face the ultimate problems. When they have seriously endeavoured, as the Fathers did, to sound the depths of the mystery of God's revelation in Christ and its significance for the destiny of man, it will be no reproach to them if their findings are not simple, any more than the findings of science and philosophy are simple.

The Rev. John Douglas, an Edinburgh minister, has written a simple and popular book of apologetic, *Affirmations that Affirm* (U.F. Church of Scotland Publications Department; 2s. 6d. net). Its origin explains both its character and scope. It arose out of discussions which the author had with groups of young men and women, and the nine chapters contain the author's summing up. The subjects are all to the point: God in Nature, The Old Testament Revelation of God, Jesus' Revelation of the Father, Jesus as Saviour, the Cross, the

Church, the Assurance of Immortality, and Christ and the Non-Christian Religions. The author naively protests against criticisms which point out omissions in a book of this kind. This forestalls an obvious comment on his first essay, which deals with 'God in the World of Nature' without facing what is the gravest difficulty most people feel about that subject, the fact of 'cruelty.' Otherwise this essay is an excellent treatment of the matter. The same may be said of the other discussions. Indeed, without containing anything very fresh, the book is an able defence of the main Christian positions on modern lines, and will be very useful for the same kind of people from whose questions and difficulties it originated.

In *The Savage Solomons as They Were and Are* (Seeley, Service; 21s. net) Mr. S. G. C. Knibbs, F.R.G.S., a Government Surveyor, gives an account of his experiences in this group of islands which form a British Protectorate in the South Pacific. Here we have native races emerging rapidly from methods of barbarism under the influences of missionary agency, protection from inter-tribal and savage warfare, and legitimate trade. Mr. Knibbs was consoled with on his voyage from Sydney to what were termed 'the Sorrowful Islands.' But when the steamer cast anchor off one of the islands he found the scene was all that he had read about—the palms, the forests, the wonderful blue water, the coral reefs glowing up in emerald green, the colour and atmosphere, surpassingly beautiful. 'The South Sea Islands,' he says, 'possess an attraction which defies explanation. One will find men who growl about the conditions under which they are compelled to live, but who nevertheless return again and again to undergo the same privations.' Two decades have been sufficient to work a revolution here as elsewhere among savage tribes. Take this example of that touch of Nature that makes the whole world kin. 'The humorous films and those showing men-o'-war and guns are what the natives like best. . . . When the clown finally falls off the stage amongst the orchestra, to be helped back with his foot through a drum, there is always loud applause and shrieks of laughter.'

Death and Renewal, by Mr. Poul Bjerre (Williams & Norgate; 10s. 6d. net), is a somewhat hazy and bewildering book. It contains a vast amount of beautiful imagery and poetic diction, but with little orderliness or rational sequence. It is the work of an impassioned, not to say hysterical, soul brooding upon the catastrophe of the World War.

'To us who had a share in the experience of the world catastrophe, the death of millions, the death of civilization, the death of the god of mercy, nothing was left but faith in the one thing—in Death.' The result is a certain vague theosophy. 'God is neither alive nor dead; God is the rhythm of death and renewal in its beginning, its end and its very least inflection.' This faith the writer calls the clair-obscure. 'Whoever finds the clair-obscure becomes both a *genuine* mystic and a *genuine* realist. And when in the depth of his being he feels the heart of the universe beating

with the rhythm of the clair-obscure, he reaches beyond wholeness and attains holiness.'

It will be remembered that a series of articles by Canon Battersby-Harford appeared in this magazine last autumn, attracting considerable attention among Old Testament scholars. The articles have now been reprinted, and may be had from Mr. Henderson, George IV. Bridge, Edinburgh, or direct from the author at Ripon. The title is *Altars and Sanctuaries in the Old Testament*, and the price 1s.

The Census of Quirinius.

BY THE REVEREND J. W. JACK, M.A., GLENFARG.

THE verses in which Luke (2¹⁻³) alludes to a general census of the Roman Empire, carried out in Judæa at the time of Christ's birth and under the legateship of Quirinius in Syria, have given rise to an abundant literature and provoked numerous critical comments.¹ Historians find no difficulty about the statement that a census took place at this time by order of Augustus, for it is known that enrolments were made every fourteen years in Egypt under Roman rule, and there can be nothing improbable in one taking place in Judæa at the time indicated. Indeed, the statistics of the Empire, including those of dependent States, were a favourite study of Augustus. The real difficulty lies in the statement that the census referred to was executed while Quirinius was legate. On this point the accuracy of Luke, so conspicuous in many other details, has been impugned. Syria, a consular province, could not be entrusted to Quirinius till after his consulate (12 B.C.). Now, during the immediately following years, we find M. Titius as legate about the year 10 B.C., then C. Sentius Saturninus from 9 to 6 B.C., and P. Quintilius Varus from 6 to 4 B.C. This last-named was still in office at the time of Herod's death,² so that the first Syrian legateship of Quirinius could not have commenced before the year 3 B.C. As the birth of Jesus must be placed one, two, or perhaps three years before Herod's death, it is evident that Quirinius could not have

been legate at the time. If Jesus was born while he was legate, Herod was already dead; if Herod was not yet dead, how can we speak of Quirinius? Many attempts, most of which have been enumerated and analysed by Schürer, have been made to overcome this dilemma. It has been said, *e.g.*, that the census operations may have been prolonged during two consecutive years—that they may have commenced in the year 4 B.C., before the death of Herod, and been continued and finished under Quirinius, and hence the latter's name has been associated with them as that of the governor who closed the lists and proclaimed the results. This seems a plausible argument, but historians are not impressed with it in view of the fact that the legateship of Quirinius is known to have occurred about A.D. 6 or 7, and the only census which he could have carried out was the famous one known to have taken place about that time. This was ten years or more after the Nativity, when Judæa, on the deposition of Archelaus in A.D. 6, became a Roman province annexed to Syria; and it led to the rebellion of Judas the Gaulonite or Galilæan.³ Some scholars however, advance the theory that Quirinius may

¹ Cf. Ac 5³⁷; Jos. XVII. xiii. 5, XVIII. i. 1; Schürer, *op. cit.*, i. 327; *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, iii. 287. The census of Quirinius is corroborated by a Beirût inscription, the trustworthiness of which was doubted until the original was discovered at Venice (see Dessau, *Inscript. Lat. Sel.*, 2683). It is the funeral inscription of a sub-officer who took part in the operations.

¹ For bibliography, see Schürer, *Gesch. des. Jüd. Volkes*, 3rd ed., 508 f.

² Schürer, i. 322.

have held a previous legateship of Syria, about 3 or 2 B.C., and base their view on a mutilated inscription found at Tivoli in 1764, which describes some official (the name being destroyed) who twice governed Syria under Augustus.¹ But it is apparent that even such a previous tenure of office cannot possibly have coincided with the Nativity but must have been after Herod's death. It is not worth while to discuss such points here. The number of writers who have put forward arguments in favour of Luke's statement about Quirinius is too large to deal with in this article.²

If only the name Saturninus had been written in the text instead of Quirinius, all the difficulties of the case would have vanished, for it is admitted by scholars that the Nativity probably occurred during the former's legateship, and a casual statement of Tertullian corroborates this. In reply to the Doketic views of the Marcionites, Tertullian reminds them *inter alia* that Christ's family could easily have been discovered from the census taken in Judæa by Saturninus: '*Census constat actos sub Augusto nunc in Judæa per Sentium Saturninum apud quos genus eius inquirere potuissent*' (*Adv. Marcionem*, iv. 19). Here, of course, if Tertullian had said Quirinius, we would still have been faced with the same dilemma, but his naming of Saturninus seems to show that he was drawing his information from some independent authority, possibly the same as supplied a further reference which he makes to Saturninus (Tert., *De pallio*, i.). Under the circumstances, before we regard Luke as in error, it is worth while studying the Greek uncial text of Lk 2², to see if by any chance the name Saturninus may have been originally written by Luke and been corrupted into Quirinius. A critical examination of the two names in the ancient script clearly shows not only the possibility but the likelihood of such a corruption. The spelling of the latter name, which happens in the text to be in the genitive, differs in the various manuscripts. The form *Κυρηνίου* occurs in Westcott and Hort's text, *Κυρίνου* in Lachmann's, and *Κυρείνου* in the margin of several (Westcott and Hort, Tregelles, Nestle, etc.). Now, assuming that Luke wrote *Σατυρνίνου*, it is a remarkable fact that six out

of the ten letters in this word are to be found in *Κυρείνου*, and in precisely the same order; and it is also remarkable that *α* in the ancient uncial script might easily be taken for *Κ*, and if the initial *Σ* were lost or omitted through the common fault of haplography (owing to the preceding word *Συρίας* ending in this letter), we have the syllable *Κυρ-*. The *-νίου* would quite easily become *-είνου*, for the uncial *Ν* frequently differed little or none at all from the uncial *ετα* (*Η*), and we know that *η* is an itacism which was often changed to *ε*.

A careful examination of the different styles and fashions of ancient uncial writing goes to confirm this view. First, in regard to the change of *α* into *Κ*: In the earliest uncial manuscripts of the Gospels the *α* is either written *Λ*, a form in which the two lines to the left make a sharp angle (as in *Cod. Sinaiticus*, belonging to the fourth century), or *Λ* where a small loop or curve is found (as in the Brit. Mus. Pap. 115, Hyperides, *pro Euxenippo*, written in the latter part of the first century). In either case the angle or loop is generally quite thin in comparison with the right limb of the letter, and in some manuscripts it is very small and almost insignificant in appearance (e.g. in *Codd. Laud.* 35, *Basil.* Borelli, *Arundel* 547, and many others). One can understand how such an angle or loop might become indistinct or even fade out altogether in the course of a few years. Indeed, the disappearance of slight lines in some manuscripts was of such frequency that, in some cases (as in the *Cod. Vaticanus*), a later hand had to retrace the letters. It is by no means improbable, therefore, that in the *α* only the right limb of the *α* might be left distinct enough in course of time for a copyist to see it. The right limb was not always written at the same slope, but often more perpendicular (as in *Codd. Harleian.* *Basil.*, etc.);³ and in this case, if the *T* were written close up to it (as was common in many manuscripts in regard to all the letters) and happened to be sloped a little to the left (as the superior bar of the *T* was in the second century, at least in the west),⁴ we have an excellent *Κ* (*ⲕ*), and hence the syllable *Κυρ-*. As for the disappearance of the initial *Σ* under haplography, one has only to remember that in the uncial script there were no capital letters to distinguish the beginning of names or sentences until the fifth century, when we find them in the *Cod. Alexandrina* A. All

³ In one case at least (*Cod. Dublin. Z*), it is quite perpendicular, though this style is probably unique.

⁴ Cagnat, *Cours d'épigraphie latine*, 4th ed., p. 22.

¹ *Corpus Inscript. Lat.*, xiv. 3613; Dessau, *op. cit.*, 918.

² Cf. especially W. M. Ramsay, *Was Christ born at Bethlehem?* 3rd ed., 1905, pp. 95-196; A. Mayer, *Die Schatzung bei Christi Geburt in ihrer Beziehung zu Quirinius*, 1908; W. Weber, *Zeitschrift f. neuest. Wissenschaft*, 1909, pp. 307-319; Schürer, *op. cit.* i. 534 ff.; also bibliography in *H.D.B.*, iv. 183b.

letters were of the same size, with no space between the words, and no breathings or accents or marks of any kind. On this account, when one word ended in a certain letter, as in the case before us (*Συρίας*), and the next began with the same, it was not uncommon for a copyist unintentionally to omit one of the two letters. The same haplography is found occasionally in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, and is of a type well understood by textual critics. If the copyist happened to be one who lived several decades or, perhaps, a century or two after Luke wrote his account—our earliest manuscripts (except the Oxyrhynchus fragment and some other small ones) are not earlier than the fourth century—he would probably have only a limited acquaintance with Palestine at the time of Christ's birth, and may easily have been misled into identifying the census with the great Roman one about A.D. 6 or 7, made the more famous by the rebellion which it occasioned; and consequently, if the Greek manuscript in his possession was of the nature we have indicated, he may the more easily have assumed that the name was *Κυρηνίου*, and thus eliminated or overlooked the superfluous Σ. Again and again, words have been changed by a copyist simply owing to the working of his own mind on the subject before him.

The copyist, having transcribed the first syllable *Κυρ-*, would easily slip into the further mistake of regarding *-νίου* as *-είνου*, for the uncial N being often written **Н** or even **Η** was often confused with *eta* (H), i.e. the cross line of the former did not always pass from the top of the left vertical to the bottom of the right one as in English, but often began nearly half-way down the left one and ended nearly half-way from the bottom of the right one (as in *Cod. Alexandrina A. Sinaiticus*, etc.). In some manuscripts it is here and there not far from the horizontal (as in *Codd. Borelli and Claromont*). In a few cursives, indeed, N and H almost interchange their shapes (e.g., in 440 Evan. at Cambridge and in Tischendorf's 10¹¹ or 61 of the Acts). The copyist having taken the letter to be *eta* (H), the change of HI into EI was natural. This is a change which frequently occurs in the ancient manuscripts.¹ It is a well-known itacism, or confusion of certain vowels or diphthongs having nearly the same sound. A very large proportion of the various readings brought together by collators are of this description (cf. *τιμήση* and *τιμήσει*, Mt 15⁵; and such variations as *ἡδόκησα* and *εὐδόκησα*, *ἡγαλουν* and *εὐκαλουν*). The

¹ F. H. Scrivener, *Introduction to the Criticism of the New Testament*, 2nd ed., p. 10.

copyist would thus be left with *Κυρείνου*, as in the margin of most texts; or by a different itacism he would have *Κυρίνου*, as in Lachmann's text. The transformation may be seen as follows. The letters, except the sloping T, are taken from the *Cod. Sinaiticus*:

THCCYPIACC KYPHINOV
THCCYPIACC KYPHINOV
τῆς Συρίας Κυρείνου

Marginal readings are not to be rejected. They may be the surviving representatives of other codices perhaps even earlier than any now extant. The mere fact that there is a marginal reading implies some amount of corruption, and the stranger the reading the more likely is it to be genuine.

We have only to remember the great number and variety of copyists through whose hands the early manuscripts passed. Most of them at first must have been private persons, unskilled in the art of writing, whose object was not to introduce a version fit for sale, but to use it themselves or transmit it to friends. Professional scribes, unless they happened to be Christians, would not be employed to transcribe the text, and skilled calligraphy was not, therefore, to be expected. The persecution under Diocletian, too; and then the reaction under Constantine, must have had considerable influence on the state of the text. In addition to all this, there were official revisers who made many changes. The whole *Cod. Sinaiticus*, for instance, is disfigured by many corrections made by an early reviser, many more by an ancient hand of the sixth century, a greater number still by some scholar of the seventh century who often cancels the changes introduced by his predecessors, and numerous others again in later years by as many as eight different writers.

Looking at the matter, then, from all aspects, it seems not at all improbable that Luke's original text contained the name of Saturninus, the penultimate predecessor of Quirinius. The argument receives strength from Tertullian's statement, already referred to. This Roman lawyer and historian must have had access to many trustworthy sources, and by happy chance he has preserved the evidence which not only confirms the census at the time of the Nativity, but seems to reveal the corruption in Luke's text. If this view be correct, the Nativity and the census referred to must be dated 7 B.C. or the beginning of 6 B.C., which would permit of the requisite interval of two or three years between that and the death of Herod.

In the Study.

Virginibus Puerisque.

'Two Mules' Burden of Earth.'

BY THE REVEREND ERNEST G. LOOSLEY, B.D.,
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'And Naaman said, Shall there not then, I pray thee, be given to thy servant two mules' burden of earth? for thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering nor sacrifice unto other gods, but unto the LORD.'—2 K 5¹⁷.

EVERY boy knows something about geography, and can give quite a lot of information about imports and exports of various countries. Well, what do we import from Australia? 'Wool, wheat, apples.' Yes, that is right. But I was reading the other day about one of the strangest imports ever received into this country, and it came from Australia. It consisted of one hundred and fifty tons of soil, brought over to England in order to make a cricket pitch. I suppose the pitch in some parts of Australia is so hard that it almost breaks the heart of many English 'test' bowlers; and in order to enable them to practise on a wicket exactly like those they would have to play on in Australia, a rich lover of cricket imported these one hundred and fifty tons of soil to Broome Park, in Kent—where Lord Kitchener used to live. After this, we ought to stand a better chance of keeping the 'ashes.'

It must be a rare thing for soil to be exported from one country to another. But I remember reading of one other case, that happened many years ago. Let me describe it to you. A caravan party is trekking along one of the oldest roads in the world, the road that runs from Egypt through Palestine to Babylonia. They are going northwards towards Damascus, and from their appearance we get the impression that an important and wealthy man is making the journey, and taking with him all the provision that is needed for himself and his servants. Some of the luggage we can recognize at once—tents, food, water. But what is the load that these two mules are carrying, about which the driver seems to be so particular? Let us ask him.

'Your mules seem to have a heavy load: what have you in those sacks?'

'This is soil from the land of Israel,' he answers. 'My master is taking it home with him to Syria.'

'Soil! What for? Haven't you enough soil in Syria? Is the soil of the land of Israel so much better than that of Syria? What is your master

going to do with it? Is he trying to grow some of the plants of Israel?'

'You may well ask,' the driver replies; 'but it isn't for his garden that he wants this soil. He is going to build an altar upon it, and that is why I have to be so particular not to lose any of it. He has just been healed of a terrible disease by the God of the Israelites, and he is going to worship Him when he gets home. But, of course, Rimmon is our God in Syria, and my master Naaman could not build an altar to the God of Israel without some of the soil of Israel on which to build it. That is why these two mules are carrying their heavy load of earth.'

A strange old idea, wasn't it? Each god having his own land that belonged to him, so that he could only be worshipped within the borders of that land! And it wasn't only the poor old mule-driver who believed this, but his rich and well-educated master Naaman believed it too; and even the prophet of the God of Israel seems to have believed it, for he didn't try to teach Naaman any better.

You could teach him better than that *now*, couldn't you? Not long after Naaman's time, men arose in Israel who came to see that there was only one God, who belonged to every nation, and cared for every nation, and could be worshipped in every land throughout the world. That was once a new idea, though it is now so old. And when men came to realize that the one God, who made the whole world, was everywhere, and could be worshipped anywhere, they no longer needed to carry home with them 'two mules' burden of earth' in order to make a little home for a god outside his own country.

Nearest to Everything.

BY THE REVEREND JOHN MACBEATH, M.A., GLASGOW.

'I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go into the house of the Lord.'—Ps 122¹.

I was once staying in a large hotel in one of the great cities of America. I had taken lunch on the roof garden at a great height above the street, higher than our city monuments. Then I went to my bedroom to do some writing. I found the hotel notepaper and envelopes very interesting. On the top half of the sheet was an outline map of the centre of the city, and at the heart of it a miniature picture of the hotel, with the motto underneath, 'Nearest to Everything.'

The picture showed that the hotel was a very convenient residence for most things in the city. A great many other buildings and institutions were marked, and these seemed to be 'Everything' that was of any particular consequence. The motto was repeated in two words on the envelopes—NEAREST EVERYTHING.

The map and the names were of great value. I looked them over. There was the Post Office—we all want that sometimes. And the Library, that was good. Railway Stations, too, are very necessary things. Then there were great public stores: most people want to know where these are situated. The Mint was marked too, where the money is made and stored. The Academy of Music was there, also Independence Hall, and the Art Museum. A great many theatres were marked and named.

When I had carefully examined it all, I asked myself, 'Is that everything'?

It is the kind of question you ask when you are packing up for the holidays. All the travelling trunks, and cases, are about to be closed and locked. Has anything been forgotten or overlooked? And the question goes round the family—'Is that everything?' I asked the same question that day in the hotel. But everything was not there. Do you know what I missed?

I missed the churches. There wasn't a single church marked or named on the city picture, and it was not because the churches did not exist. I had preached in four or five of the central churches of the city, but not one appeared on the map, even though there were several within a few minutes' walk of the hotel.

Can a city have everything if it hasn't got a church? Is the map of the city complete if it omits the churches? If we take the Church out of our lives, can we say that we have everything without it?

What are the things that are everything to us? The most important things? Food and comfort, and light and air, and clothes and books and all that? But Jesus said, 'Seek ye first the kingdom of God and all these things shall be added unto you.' They are *added*, they don't come first.

A wise old teacher once said that it was a very dangerous thing for a man or woman not to belong to any church. And it's even more dangerous if our young people can think of the map of the city without any church in it, or if they can think of living without belonging to any church. A life without worship, without religion, without Christian faith and hope and love is like having eyes without

sight, and ears without hearing, for it is life without God in it.

Our churches ought to be the best buildings in the city, and they ought to be the most crowded, because they represent the best things in life—the worship of God and the glory of Jesus Christ. They teach us that the things we most truly live by are love and righteousness, faith in God and charity amongst men, the pursuit of truth and goodness and peace.

A great traveller once said that Britain owed much of her influence in the world to her homes and her churches. Then we must cultivate our homes and we must cultivate our churches, both the home church and the holiday church. If we miss Christ we are poor, though we have any amount of money; but if we have Him, we are rich, however little money we possess. That was what the brave-spirited Apostle Paul meant when he said that he was 'as having nothing, yet possessing all things.'

He would have sung with great heartiness the hymn:

I've found a friend in Jesus,
He's *Everything* to me.

The Christian Year.

TWELFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

A Call and a Warning.

'Come, and let us return unto the Lord: for he hath torn, and he will heal us; he hath smitten, and he will bind us up. After two days will he revive us: in the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight. Then shall we know, if we follow on to know the Lord. . . . O Ephraim, what shall I do unto thee? O Judah, what shall I do unto thee? for your goodness is as a morning cloud, and as the early dew it goeth away.'—Hos 6¹⁻⁴.

What stands out as essential in repentance is a man's turning from his sin to God. Two forces account for this turning—a sense of sin and an apprehension of God's mercy, and both have their place; only they are not of equal weight. Since in men the force which draws is stronger than that which drives, the first necessity is a vision of what God is like. Hosea is abundantly conscious of the guilt of men, but he is still more conscious of God's mercy. In the previous verse he has darkly hinted at the possibility of God's leaving the Hebrews to themselves; but when he makes one effort more to get at their hearts, it is not by way of storm and scolding, but by a fresh exhibition of the inimitable grace of God. You cannot have seen my God as I see Him, for no one could resist the appeal of that amazing beauty. And thus, as it were, he takes the

people by the hand and says, 'Let us go together, you and me, to seek Him'; and by way of persuasion, he tells of what his God is like. For he believed, as Paul did, that it is 'the goodness of the Lord which leads to repentance.' Let us consider what he says in commendation of his God and ours:

1. He speaks of Him as *near*: 'After two days will he revive us, on the third day he will raise us up, and we shall live in his sight.' No slow approaches are needed, no gradual processes extending over years, for renewal is possible at once. To a mass of men God is little else than a name, a formless rumour of power and fear, but such men do not know the help of His presence. A woman whose boy has died will often grow impatient when good people talk to her of God, for all her boy's ways rise up in her memory, and all he has been to her. Nothing could be more definite; and over against this absolute distinctness of remembrance are a few vague words about God's goodness—a great blank, a face with no features, a formless immensity, without helping power of any kind. That is what also makes repentance difficult. Men are held by such very substantial restraints. What they are is due not to the free choice of to-day, but to the growth of habit extending over years. Education and friendships and the standards and opinions of their set have made their mark upon them; and though at times they would like to make some clear amendment, they are always hampered by their past. When a preacher calls them to attempt a new beginning, their better sense admits that he is right; but as they leave the church this solid fact of habit reasserts itself, and in face of it they scarcely even try. If on their side they knew of a power as actual and as close as the power against them, they might take courage; but because they know of none they are beaten before ever they begin the fight.

2. But further, in commendation of his God, the prophet declares that He is *gracious*. He multiplies pleasant words, attributing to God such gifts as, if we heartily believed in them, would leave us little room for mourning. There are sore hearts everywhere and men whose life is running low, and to these he makes the declaration about God, that He will heal, that He will bind up, that men shall *live*—live and not merely exist—in His sight. The Greek version of the Old Testament adds a delightful phrase, which is a little gospel in itself. 'Let us follow on to know the Lord, and we shall find him as a dawn prepared.' Our day is nearly done, men say, and we now are bound to travel on in

deepening gloom to darkness and eclipse and defeat. It is not so, says Hosea; I tell you of One who can give you the dew of the morning again, and an outlook over the radiant possibilities of a whole new day. God's power is infinite, says the prophet, but it works always through His kindness; it is a power of healing.

Words are often nothing more than words; but the message here is interpreted by the prophet's act and attitude; for he himself is without fear in God's high presence, and taking his people with him, as it were, he associates his confidence with their obscure distrust of God. Since they cannot see, it is the duty of any one with eyes to deliver them from distrust by his boldness, and from fear by his rejoicing. That is where all good men, in their measure, have served the world. They are like the vowels in the alphabet of society, helping into utterance much that else would remain unspoken. There are vague gropings after goodness in men whose standard of life is low: there are shamefaced ideals, and shy instincts which might speak out if some one else spoke first. And when a good man comes, not pretending to superiority but living as a man with men, his courage makes many brave, his trust in God awakens hope in others. 'Come,' says this great heart in an act of loving association with the moral bankruptcy about him—'Come, let us return to the Lord.' And some began to pray, who could never by themselves have prayed; they felt that in God there must be a very wealth of grace when they looked upon the contentment of this sorely tried man. There was a light in his face, which, according to their calculations, ought not to have been there, and it seemed to come to him from knowing that God who to them was only a rumour. So interest stirred; and if they did not wish for God Himself, they wished for the healing effects of His presence, as these appeared in the face of this His servant. 'God took me,' says one, 'from a horrible pit and from the miry clay, he set my feet on a rock, and established my goings (starting me out on life again), he put a new song in my mouth of praise to our God.' And then he adds, 'Many shall see it and shall fear, and shall trust in the Lord,' for faith is quickened by contact with the believing. That is a description of the way in which Jesus Himself helped men and helps them still. 'It is through him,' says Peter, 'that we are believers in God.'

3. The prophet bears witness also to the *endlessness* of God. In his call to 'know, to follow on to know the Lord,' he hints that there is more to learn of God than the wisest has yet declared, that there

are heights beyond our highest. Some people hold back from faith because of the way in which it was first presented to them; to this day they stumble over points of doctrine on which their early teachers laid exclusive stress, and thus they are kept from knowledge of their own. But in God there is room for many opinions. Saint, prophet, evangelist in turn proclaimed what they had discovered of Him, until it might have seemed that nothing more was left to know or to declare. But always others came, like voyagers landing at some different bay in a continent only half explored, and their report is of new territories through which they passed.

Thus the prophet spoke, calling his fellows back to a God so wonderful; but then, with sudden passion, he adds a warning. He saw how easily his message might be abused by men who, for a moment, would catch at it, and then let it go. When they are in trouble many are glad to hear of mercy, but they wish nothing else than mercy. An old Scottish preacher says bluntly, 'Esau grat his fill, but he never grat himself into repentance.' People are ready to leap at what penitence secures, but penitence itself, the deep and resolute turning to God, may lie outside their calculation. Nothing is more baffling than such a temper; and Hosea represents the great God Himself as at His wits' end with men who have desires, and confessions, and even tears, but in whom nothing is deep or enduring. 'O Ephraim, what shall I do unto thee? For thy goodness is like the morning mist, which goes soon away.'

'The great want of modern piety,' says Faber, 'is a deep, vigorous, inward repentance. Life goes too fast for that. Rapid liver and rapid thinkers make rapid worshippers; and rapid worshippers are rapid penitents, and the spirit of inward repentance fares ill with all this. Deep work is too slow for our modern pace.' The contrast is scarcely just as between ancient and modern, for the trouble is of all ages alike. The woman, through whose disloyalty the prophet had to learn his lesson, was glad to see her husband—good, easy creature—come after her; but she had no conception of what his forgiveness of her cost him, or what it aimed at. He had enthroned her once in his heart as queen, and it was agony to think of her as disgraced and fallen. To see her merely clean and decent was far too little, for love is relentless in its demands; but for that she cared nothing, and our superficial penitence fails at the same point.

'We thus judge,' says Paul, 'that if one died for all then all died, and that he died for all that they who live should not henceforth live unto them-

selves, but to him who died for them and rose again.' It is thus that repentance must be deepened by consideration not of what we desire—kindness, healing, friendship—but of what He desires. 'He gave himself for us,' says Paul again, 'that he might purify us unto himself as a people for his own possession, zealous for good works.' That is the Lord to whom we must return, and with whom our life is safe.¹

THIRTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

A Sage among the Prophets.

'I turned about, and my heart *was set* to know and to search out, and to seek wisdom and the reason of things.'—Ec 7²⁵ (R.V.).

The author of Ecclesiastes is supposed to have been a Hebrew sage who lived either in the time of Alexander the Great, or over a century later, when Palestine was being wrested from Egypt by the Seleucid dynasty of Syria. Dean Plumptre conceives him as a Jew of Palestine, who had been instructed in his youth in the oracles of the Old Testament, and disciplined in the rigorous customs of Hebrew piety. From hence he made his way to Alexandria—now rising into fame as a seat of learning. Into this new world of knowledge he threw himself with youthful ardour. We may imagine him as, his mind enlightened and his powers matured, he developed independence of thought, or when, in accordance with his self-chosen title of Koheleth or Debater, he joined in the discussions in which school clashed with school. Thereafter he may be supposed to have tried other experiences, and also to have made adventures in the sphere of action; and at the last to have written a book in which he garnered the wisdom that had been learned, reproduced the occasional moods of doubt and pessimism that had accompanied his pilgrimage, and ended where he began, by re-asserting his invincible Jewish faith in a God who assuredly lives and reigns, though clouds and thick darkness envelop His throne.

So the Preacher's message is twofold.

1. *The Intellectual Message.* This may be summarized by saying that learning is an invaluable possession, but that the pursuit of it is attended by serious drawbacks and dangers. His estimate, in fact, takes the form of a profit-and-loss account.

(1) That wisdom is a priceless boon he affirms in emphatic terms. He observes that it excels folly—which, no doubt, includes ignorance—as far as light excels darkness. He gives two reasons in support

¹ W. M. Macgregor, *Repentance unto Life*, 13.

of this judgment. One is that knowledge is power. 'Wisdom is a strength to the wise more than ten rulers which are in a city.' It is a power which can sometimes accomplish as much even as money. 'Wisdom is a defence, even as money is a defence.' And sometimes it brings safety when all other resources fail. 'There was a little city, and few men within it; and there came a great king against it; and besieged it, and built great bulwarks against it: now there was found in it a poor wise man, and he by his wisdom delivered the city.' What he had chiefly in view in these sayings was doubtless the knowledge of the properties of things, which gives man dominion over Nature, with skill and ingenuity in applying this knowledge for protection against danger and the promotion of material well-being. He gives another reason for affirming the excellence of knowledge, which shows that he had also other kinds of wisdom in view which did not produce palpable material results—such as the visions of the poets, the meditations of the philosophers on the ultimate nature of things, and the meaning of human life. He knows a wisdom which, if it do no more, at least yields a large inward profit to those who possess it. It is the sovereign virtue of wisdom that 'it giveth life to them that have it.' It effects an enrichment and refinement of soul which is even mirrored in the face. When the Preacher said that 'wisdom maketh the face to shine,' he said the same thing, only that he said it more picturesquely, which Matthew Arnold expressed in his famous proposition that 'culture augments the excellence of our nature, and renders our intelligent being still more intelligent.'

(2) On the other hand, we find scattered throughout the book a number of reflections on the disadvantages and disappointments which attend the pursuit of wisdom. One is the painfulness of the student's life. 'In much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.' Was the Preacher thinking of the new burdens that had been laid on his spirit as with widening knowledge he realized the prevalence of suffering in the world? and the vanity of human ambitions? Was he recalling the inward peace which he enjoyed in the sheltered conditions of his early life, and which he imperilled when he exposed himself to the chaotic influences of the wider world? Or was he thinking only of the brain-weariness, the laborious days, the unrestful nights to which he elsewhere makes reference, and doubting whether the gains had been proportionate to the sacrifice? Again, he is sure that much of the labour is wasted effort, since all is a rediscovery of what was known before

—'there is no new thing under the sun.' Further, he complains that the wise do not receive their due recompense. 'I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill.' Nor do they receive their meed of honour. The poor wise man who delivered the city was spoken of for a day, but afterward no one remembered that same poor man. And finally, to omit lesser considerations, death appears upon the scene and reduces the sage to the same level as the fool. Was the labour worth while?

It is true that the debit side of his account has to be revised in the circumstances, and with the outlook of our later age. One of the privileges and glories of these later days is that there is so much which is new under the sun and in the regions beyond the sun. To-day the poor wise man who does anything so considerable as save a city can depend on substantial rewards in both wealth and honour. And as for the crushing argument from the inevitable spoliation by death, the situation has been changed by the gospel which brought life and immortality to light, and the scholar's unceasing toil seems more reasonable in the prospect of the possibilities of eternity.

2. *The Religious Message.* On a superficial view it might appear that the Preacher has no religious message—that he is a seeker after truth, not the apostle of an assured creed. Yet we may be sure that there was some good reason why the author of Ecclesiastes, though he sometimes uses the language of a sceptic, and oftener that of a worldling, was associated with the goodly fellowship of believers and saints in the sacred library of the Old Testament. Part of the explanation is that he rendered a service to religion on the negative side by setting aside the claims of any earthly object to be accepted as the chief end of man. He mentions the chief blessings which are coveted by the mass of mankind—pleasure, wealth, power; and he declares that it is not in them to fill the soul with an enduring satisfaction and tranquillity. Nor, again, is the chief good for man to be found, where it may be sought by nobler spirits, in the achievements and possessions of the intellectual life: this also, notwithstanding its greater dignity and its higher utility, must leave a man, if he have nothing more, with a sense of emptiness and at discord with himself. Human life needs to be rounded off with a yet higher and more comprehensive good.

The Preacher not only felt the need of a religion,

but possessed one which had elements of truth, of purity, and even of moral grandeur. He ever writes as if all serious thinking about human life must take God for one of its axioms. He also profoundly believes in God as the power manifested in the world, the author of the constitution and course of nature, the being upon whom all creatures depend for their existence and preservation, and for the diverse conditions of their lot. His attitude toward God is marked by the deepest reverence. In presence of the supreme reality he feels that speech is presumption. 'God is in heaven, and thou upon earth : therefore let thy words be few.' He despises the superstition of the readers of dreams ; he warns against the offering of the sacrifices of fools, and he feels that the true service of God is the fear of the Lord which constrains man to depart from evil. He has been charged with scepticism, but his scepticism meant chiefly that he did not profess to know the Almighty as fully as others professed to know Him ; and especially that he did not pretend to understand the doings of God in the detailed arrangements of this strange and confused world. He could not undertake to justify the ways of God to man. But he was clear that God and duty are the assured realities on which we must build our lives. And so his book ends with the words which are the instinctive reiteration of the fundamental article of the creed of his fathers—'Fear God, and keep his commandments : for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every hidden thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil.'

We who live after Christ have a richer, a deeper, a more comforting, a better-grounded creed. From the depths of the being of the Almighty and All-wise God, the region where the Preacher bowed in awe before the inscrutable, there has shined upon us the revelation of a God of love in the face of Jesus Christ. But there are still lessons for many of us in the message of this sage of the twilight. He is an early and a very interesting witness to the truth, which many in our time need to learn anew, that art and science and letters are no substitute for religion. Moreover, those of us who are rooted in the Christian faith may also learn of him that God is greater than our widest and deepest thoughts ; and that it is our duty, even when we cannot understand the mysteries in the providential order, to bow in humility and trust before the unsearchable will. And not least, may we learn from the book and its context that, if we are faithful to the light we have, it will shine to more and more ; and that he who shows the fear of God in a life consecrated

to the highest that he knows, may hope in the end to find deliverance from all his bewilderment of mind and travail of soul.¹

FOURTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Harvest Sermon.

'The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved.'—Jer 8²⁰.

Harvest home is often a happy season. When all the dangers which have threatened the seed since it was put into the ground—drought and deluge, mildew and worm—have been escaped, and the last load has been secured, the sense of work satisfactorily done makes man feel contented and glad, with energy for a new start. But harvest home is not only a season of contentment and pleasure, it is often a time of serious reflection. There is something in autumn which seems to make us thoughtful. The days lose their radiance. As the sunbeams slant across the landscape and the birds become silent, and the leaves fall noiselessly to the ground, it seems so much like a parable of human life, descending to its end, that one cannot help looking back and sighing, and looking forward and trembling.

1. Each portion of life has allotted to it its own appropriate work. We are made to work ; we must be employed. The powers we possess at one time of our life are not the same as those we possess at another part of our life. The powers we possess should point out our work. In childhood we are dependent upon others. We are like soft clay, capable of being moulded into almost any shape. Then this is the season for education. And youth is a time of hope and ambition and ardent affection, when we feel we can do almost anything. That is a time we should not waste. It is motor-power which may drive the engine or be allowed to escape in noisy waste. And manhood is the time of mature strength, and sound judgment, produced by experience, when a home is to be made and kept comfortable and happy and good, both for wife and children. The powers and the circumstances of each period show what is the proper work of that period. The lesson from this is that each part of our life is a very solemn thing ; that if we don't do the proper work of each at its own proper time we lose that which we can never find again. In some cases we may partially recover lost ground. But in doing it at the improper time we lose the chance of doing something else. If we do to-day's work to-morrow, when will to-morrow's work be

¹ W. P. Paterson, in *Sub Corona*, 228.

done? and what if when the judgment comes we are a day behind? Have we thought much about such things as these? Have we felt that our life, however humble, has so much deep meaning in it? Begin this thoughtful autumn-time. It is a special season for reflection.

2. The next thing is that each period of life stands to the succeeding periods in the relation of a sowing-time. Every day we are sowing and every day we are reaping. For in all work there is profit. We hear often people say it does not matter—it would have been just the same if we had not done it. But it does matter. It is not the same. Even the least and most trivial action alters things in its measure, and alters them for ever. From each action of ours there come up two harvests. First, whatever we do is done. If a man ploughs a field, the harvest is that the field is ploughed. If a man paints a picture, the product is the completed picture. If a man tries to relieve distress or to make others happier, the gain is in distress diminished and in happiness conferred. But each action has a second harvest. It consists in the reaction of conduct on ourselves. Not only does the man who ploughs the field have the reward of seeing his work completed and the field ploughed; but as practice makes perfect, he is a better ploughman for his work if he has done his best; and a worse one if he does not care how he does it. The artist not only sees his picture, but he has increased his skill, and mayhap some new perception of beauty has dawned upon him while he has been working which eventually will produce a new power. The man who has tried to make others happy not only sees the pleasure he has given, but has also obtained by his conduct a larger, kindlier heart.

3. But if each period of life has its own appropriate work, and one period is a sowing-time of which the succeeding is the necessary reaping-time, in like manner this whole life of ours in this world has one peculiar all-important work, is one sowing-time; and the next life is the great reaping-time—the Eternal Harvest. Are we doing the work of this period? Is it clear to us what this work is? The work of this life is to be what we called 'saved.' Some people think that it is a fact of the next life, not the work of this. They think that it means to get to heaven; but it does not. It means to become heavenly, rather than to get into a place we name heaven. To be saved and to be safe are different things. Some men only want to be safe. They are quite contented to be idle, intemperate, and dishonest; but they would like to escape condemnation. But to be saved is to be delivered

from all our badness, to have all our mean, greedy, brutal dispositions subdued and destroyed. It is to be saved that we are here; and that is to be 'cleansed from all unrighteousness.'

Is this all-important life-work making progress? The best time to begin it is in youth, when the heart is pure and the affections warm and generous and confidence unshaken, and the power of habit limited and plasticity perfect. The young should take advantage of this precious sowing-time.

But there are too many who, in middle life, have not begun this great work. With such it is summer. The green corn should be waving, but instead there is barrenness or the fruitless prodigality of weeds. The work of being saved is harder for them. The soil is hardening and drying up. They have lost time; and that they can never get back. But still the year is not over. Let them take hold upon the present, and put in some good seed. It cannot perish, and God will give the increase. And there are even those who have outlived the heats of youth and the steady strength of manhood; who begin to feel the inroads of decay; but who are without religion and all its guiding light and vital warmth; whose affections are chilled, whose faith in mankind is dead; whose capability of joy is withered away. An old man with icy heart and peevish temper and greedy craft; an old man who cannot pray, who cannot lean his broken strength upon God, is a sad sight—harvest past, the summer ended, and not saved.¹

FIFTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Standards.

A SERMON TO BOYS.

'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.'—Mt 28²⁰.

Christ left His disciples to carry on His work in a world of fluctuating ideas, where all standards seemed to be in the melting-pot. The Jew saw his fellows adopting debased Greek ideas, saw the Zion of his dreams vanish before the reality of Roman discipline, saw his leaders divided between a useless intransigence and servile trimming. Rome was no better off. The old discipline of self in citizenship was fast disappearing in a wave of Oriental luxury; the old gods had no appeal but that of nationality; and the East supplied a variety of new cults, from which you took your pick.

Cross-currents everywhere, but for the disciples one unmoving mark—Christ. And because there

¹ W. Page-Roberts, *True Religion*, 106.

was this one star, men and nations came quickly to steer by it. In the chaos and welter of the next thousand years, one principle remains stable—Christ's teaching; one Person rules—Christ. Like the ancient provincial governors far from home, men dishonour Him and His edicts by cruelty and lust and wrong, but they can never get away from Him.

The reason of the confusion of standards at the time of Christ is not far to seek. For long, amid primitive peoples, the idea of right and wrong had held an absolute if narrow sway, but as travel increased, men came to see that right and wrong in one place was not always the same as right and wrong in another: that gods, too, and modes of worship differed. Among the Greeks, first, there grew up a school of thought which held that one man's opinion was as good as another's, and therefore there could be no absolute standard. It followed strictly that right and wrong were really erroneous ideas; the only true right was for every man to do as he pleased. This was the logical issue of the Sophists' teaching, though they did not always press it so far.

But Christ gave a doctrine of right and wrong that was absolute and final, unaffected by the local customs of time and place. He showed that God is love in His absolute Being, and yet could still be love under the limitations of human life in a particular year and a particular place—more, that in these very limitations love found its greatest strength. The Crucifixion showed His *ἀσθένεια* (His powerlessness) at its greatest; and in that weakness He redeemed the world. In Him we see Love itself, as perfect in human conditions as in the timelessness of Eternal Godhead, utterly Itself everywhere and always.

Time and place become shadows before that reality. The standard is absolute, and that standard is with us even to the end of the world, because it is the living God. Conditions change, men change, social systems change; but through it all, human personality has in it *some* love; *some* power of self-surrender to draw others closer; *some* capacity for finding its greatest strength in its weakness and limitation; *some* joy in accepting weakness and limitation because of the power of service which they bring. It takes a good deal of experience, and often of suffering, to make a man understand how love can be the fount of all, the origin of all, the only final power—and yet be so powerless that it cannot hinder its own daily crucifixion—to see that absolute power is absolute self-surrender, to begin to form the faintest picture of God. This

comes only by experience—by living. But any one can understand that if God be indeed Love, as Jesus Christ came to teach and manifest, then we have a standard outside and beyond all social customs and individual guesses; outside and beyond the things of time. If Christ were God indeed, in Him we see this as a living fact. That is the meaning of 'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.' He leaves room for social change, but none for the abrogation of right and wrong; for right is love and understanding, wrong is lovelessness and blindness.

You are preparing to go out into a world of standards as fluctuating and confused as any that time has ever known. No doubt some of you have a theoretical creed of sloppy toleration already. Well, in the world you will find it in full swing. Men say: 'So-and-so likes to get drunk—well, it is his own affair, and he has a perfect right to if he likes.' 'So-and-so holds a different view about women from mine; but that is his business. He may be right, just as likely as I.' 'So-and-so likes to gamble heavily—why shouldn't he, if he likes to stand the racket?'

Two simple facts might be pointed out here.

The first is that the people who argue in this sort of way are very apt to hold two contradictory opinions without noticing it. The people who shout most loudly about the right of every man to express himself exactly as he chooses, also shout most loudly about the right of the State to take entire control of a man's work and money, and to interfere in his family affairs. Now an ideal, and a truth, may lie behind one or both of these statements, but it cannot be a clear ideal or a clear truth.

The second fact is that if you decide that one opinion is as good as another—that what a man chooses to think right *is* right—then if *you* think a thing is good for you and *I* think it is bad for you, *I* think you are wrong, and *I* am right in thinking so—which does not seem to get us much further, but which does show that your opinion is at the same moment right and wrong, and so is mine, which is surely a little contradictory! But it goes further, because as soon as you apply the same principle to *thinking* and not merely to acting, it becomes clear that men cannot *know* anything at all: truth and knowledge and reality just vanish, as Socrates and Plato showed long ago.

Of course, in this post-war world of rapid change, the lesser standards alter, and things are apt to get topsy-turvy, but is that a reason for throwing away all that has been definitely learned in centuries of struggle and thought?

'That they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us.' Does that mean nothing to you? Is it not, in fact, a better thing to keep ideals, to think clearly, to serve truth, to help the weak, to do no wrong to manhood or womanhood, to make peace, to think and speak no evil, to do no work below your best, to be generous in thought and in act, to see and call out the good in every man you come across rather than the evil, than to serve the fashion and the passion of the moment?

The tolerance of to-day makes one sick. True tolerance lies in 'Judge not, that ye be not judged.' But Christ did not see any contradiction between that statement and His indictment of the Pharisees; and there is none. He would not allow the stoning of the woman taken in adultery, but He spoke strongly enough about lust, and he told that woman pretty plainly that adultery was sin—from henceforth sin no more. Tolerance is not the denial of all standards and ideals, but refraining from self-righteousness and from adding to the burden of sinners—great enough often, God knows—by a cruelty that cuts them off from all faith and hope, and kills the germ of love that is in them. Go out to proclaim Christ's standard—to proclaim Christ *as* the standard. Go out to hate evil; to fight the sentimentalism and muddle-headedness of false tolerance; to uphold, in the face of all ridicule and contempt, your certainty that right is right and wrong, wrong. The world needs leaders; not complacent time-serving nonentities. Of course, you will have to suffer! God made the world, and in the powerlessness of love, He, the eternal, the omnipotent, waits helplessly through His own self-surrender. God came into the world, the historic Christ, and in the powerlessness of love redeemed the world, because love is eternal and unchanging under every limitation. *He suffers!*

And still the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God, to be delivered from the bondage of corruption. *Where* are the sons of God? *When* will they accept Christ's redemption by understanding and co-operating with His love? He is powerless till they do. Yet, for those who can see and understand, He is there, holding up an ultimate absolute standard which nothing can shake; the standard of love, which is oneness with Him and with our fellows. 'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.'

You may say: 'You affirm a standard which is so general, that it is of no use to me. I want to know whether *this* is right, whether *that* is wrong.'

No one can give you a magic formula, nor dispense you from the responsibility of decision in each individual case. But in this standard of God's love lies the power of a touchstone. Try it, and you will no longer doubt. Sometimes your decision will run counter to the opinion of the society you live in, sometimes not, and sometimes you may make mistakes through inexperience. But your decision will be based, not upon the whim and fashion of a moment, but upon one immutable principle.¹

SIXTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

The Revelation of the Cross.

'When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then shall ye know that I am he.'—Jn 8²⁸.

It is, in many ways, a tragic picture we get in this chapter—Christ is standing before a world which could see nothing in Him, and as He stands He pleads. What He is asking for is not an abstract recognition of His claim; it is for something deeper; for the insight into His nature and quality by which alone we can call Him the Son of God in any real meaning of the word. Till we have seen Him with the inward eye nothing in Christianity is clear, nothing is sure. When we have so seen Him, there is a new light on everything. At the moment the people could not see, because they had allowed themselves to be blinded by pride and false ideas, by selfishness and worldly wisdom, by all the other wrong things that rise, like mist, from our hearts to shut out the face of God. But a day was coming when they would see. The revelation would come through their own act; for that same blindness would lead them, before long, to crucify Him, and then they would see. It was with that belief in His mind that He was facing Calvary. The Cross, in the mind of Christ, was to be the place of His supreme and victorious self-revelation. He faced it, not as the victim of a tragedy, but as the hero of a conflict, which, sooner or later, He knows He will win; a conflict with the most desperate of all enemies—human malice and pride, and all the blindness these can bring. And He was right. It was through His death that the quality of His life and spirit became clear. That is historical fact. It was after He had died that the full wonder of His spirit broke upon the minds of the disciples, and they realized that His fellowship was eternal.

1. How did this revelation come about? For one thing, His death revealed the nature of their

¹ S. A. McDowall, *Creative Personality and Evolution*, 105.

sin, their malice, and their pride. How futile it all was! It could kill the body; that was its cheap triumph; but, after that, there was nothing more that it could do. It could not kill the love that was in His heart; it could not turn the blessing that He breathed into a curse; and it came to them, and to the world after them, that malice and pride were defeated on the Cross because they could not conquer love. That is the real defeat of the men who crucified Jesus. It was the fact that, when they had done their worst, they could not break His spirit, or make Him like themselves; and His death, when all was over, brought that home. It is a curious thing that we do not often realize the full significance of some of our deeds until they are done. Passion blinds us and surrounds the tempting thing with a glamour of its own. Then, when the deed is done, our eyes are opened; we discover we have perpetrated a deadly thing: destroyed something beautiful; defiled something sacred; betrayed some trust; smitten, as it were, the face of God. That is the point of Browning's poem on the effects of revenge.

Now he lies in his rights of a man!
 Death has done all death can:
 Now he recks not, he heeds
 Nor his wrong, nor my vengeance.
 I would we were boys as of old,
 In the field by the fold:
 His outrage, God's patience, man's scorn,
 Were so easily borne!

So it happened with the Crucifixion. We have little record of it in the case of those who crucified Christ; but there is Judas, who was blinded by some strange passion till his soul was twisted and the deed was done. Then it came home to him how base and mean a thing was his betrayal, and in the face of that unveiling he found it intolerable to live. And there were Joseph the rich man and Nicodemus the scholar, who had stood back from discipleship because they were afraid, and who saw in the light of that closing day, as His brave spirit passed away, what a miserable thing their fear had been, and would have given all they had to get Him back that they might stand by His side. Thus the Cross becomes the means of sin's unveiling.

And with that unveiling the way is clear for the second thing that happened: the revelation of love, forgiving and redeeming. Love won its victory because, in the face of sin, it could suffer the last agony, and yet remain love. That is the actual fact, and that unconquerable love is the secret of

Jesus. It is the very nature of His personality. To see that in Him is to see Him with the insight which awakens faith. It is to see in Him that which our hearts call God, and are thereby bowed down in wonder and worship. So it was with the centurion who commanded the execution party. As he looked on the ruin he had wrought, and saw love shining in a radiance of forgiveness and compassion he had never before seen, he said, 'Truly this was the Son of God.'

There are some who have no place for the death of Christ at all. Like William Watson, the poet, they say

What is to me this show of wounds and death?
 To me His death is nought. His life is all.

But there is confusion also here. It is not the wounds and death of which we chiefly think when we think of the Cross. That is the mistake men make in the figure on the crucifix. It gives a wrong impression, one not far short of the worship of defeat, and it evokes, maybe, only a subtle expression of self-pity. What the Cross reveals is the spirit that rose on it to a triumphant height of loving, and could have thus risen to that height no other way. It is the courage, the faith, the forgiving love there revealed that wins and saves us; and the Cross becomes the means of that revelation, because it gave Jesus His opportunity to break through in one splendid act of sacrifice in which self was forgotten and love was all in all.

2. But may not these words have a still wider meaning? Do not they suggest the one way in which we can keep alive in our hearts the redeeming conviction? It is easy, standing before the Cross, to believe that love there won a victory. But it is another thing so to keep the conviction that it becomes the fundamental principle of life, that the spirit we see there, transfigured in love and forgiveness, is the key to the meaning of life—the secret of true power, the way of real achievement. All that is involved in the conviction that Jesus is Lord. For it is an empty creed to call Him that, unless we can stand in the face of a world of evil and cruelty and selfish force and say that love is power; that love is the very omnipotence of God. The world is so dominating, its forces so impressive, its appeal to our senses so attractive, that the face which looks down from the Cross upon our streets and council-chambers and battlefields is apt to fade like a dream, unless somehow we can gain the power to keep the vision. So His words take on another suggestion. We know that He is Lord only as we go on to lift up His spirit in daily life.

When the statement became popular at the time of the War that Christianity had failed, Mr. Chesterton replied that the actual truth was that it had been found difficult and not tried. Does not this mean that it is only when faith is tried in difficulties, when, in fact, it is tried out to the point of a Cross, that we become sure of its real power? For only thus do we realize that it succeeds.

If we are to keep our convictions we must live them, and there are many occasions to give us opportunity. There is, for instance, the way of love and sympathy with the suffering of others. It would have been so easy for Jesus to turn aside, to have become absorbed in His own trouble, to shut away His heart; but everywhere He went He lifted up the Son of Man. He made them aware, through that sympathy of His, of a power which was able to heal and redeem. But there also He renewed His own inner conviction that He was the Son of God. And they who give themselves, as He gave, make a great discovery. They discover

in that love which takes them out of themselves a power which can save the world. They may not find the solution of the problem of evil, but they find something better: a fellowship with One who can redeem from evil and overcome it. Think, too, of the way of love in forgiveness of others. That is where the way of the Cross opens up in most of us. The biggest challenge Christ threw out to the world is in the call to love our enemies, and He assures us that that kind of forgiving love is the true secret of overcoming them, because it turns them into friends. It is just there that the challenge to the conviction that Christ is Lord comes home to us in practical life, but that conviction will never become a reality unless we try the way of love; then we know. It may be that when we try that way we shall fail to begin with, as He failed. But we must be ready to carry our convictions out to the point of suffering? And sooner or later the victory is with love.¹

¹ J. Reid, *In Touch with Christ*, 247.

Dogma and Spirit.

BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM FULTON, B.Sc., D.D., THE UNIVERSITY, GLASGOW.

THE title of this article was the title of a theological dissertation which I read long ago, at a time when my critical interest in the problems of theology was awakening, and which influenced my mind considerably. The author was Horace Bushnell, a name still familiar to many besides theologians by profession as that of a New England divine who 'flourished' about the middle of last century. A man of deep and intense spirituality, and a progressive Christian thinker, he wielded an influence upon the preachers of his generation at least comparable to that wielded a little later in the century, on this side of the Atlantic, by Frederick William Robertson. And not only upon preachers, and not only on this side of the Atlantic: it was a Scottish physician that placed in my hands the dissertation aforesaid, on 'Dogma and Spirit,' and he had made a theological companion of Bushnell for many years.

THE LIMITATIONS OF DOGMA.

Dogma, in the general sense of the term, is formulated opinion or logical statement of conviction.

In the particular sense in which it is here used, it is formulated opinion, logical statement of conviction, concerning the matters of religion, or—more specifically—concerning the matters of the Christian religion. The dogmas of religion seek to state or formulate the truths disclosed in religious experience, and the dogmas of the Christian religion the truths disclosed in Christian experience, just as, for example, the dogmas of physical science seek to state or formulate the truths disclosed in sense-perception.

Now the formulation of religious dogma is necessarily imperfect. For it has often been observed (Dr. John Caird, for instance, observes it in relation to theology) that language is an inadequate vehicle of spiritual ideas and impressions. It conveys spiritual things by things of sense. It interprets the world of unseen reality by means of the world that is seen. By image and symbol, analogy and metaphor, it seeks to embody the formless mysteries without us and within. The result is a number of comparatively dull propositions at the best, to represent the glowing inspirations of the Spirit; a result even more apparent

when the attempted representation is in the precise formulas of logical speech, as in the case of the dogmatic effort. While the poet or the prophet may catch living sparks of the fire that cometh down from heaven, the dogmatic thinker may well be content if he may secure still smouldering embers. Religion, to change the figure, cannot be crushed into the moulds of the logical understanding without damage to its fulness; it cannot be laid upon a rigid, logical framework, as on a Procrustean bed, without suffering mutilation, diminution, and loss.

Some theologians are so impressed with this truth of the limitations of dogma, and at the same time so distrustful of the attempt of philosophy to overcome these limitations, that for a dogmatic theology they would substitute what has been called a symbolical theology. Symbol, as compared with dogma, accentuates the difference of which I have been speaking, namely, between the original religious experience and the ideas through which it is expressed. It is fully conscious that it expresses religious experience by means of image and figure, that it blends imagination with thought, as, for example, when it looks upon God as a Father. And not only would it abandon the dogma; it holds that a figurative idea like that of the Fatherhood of God may be a better centre and support of religious feeling and experience than may be furnished by 'pure thought,' as more readily conveying the depth and fulness of the relation of the Supreme Spirit to finite spirits. This plea is reinforced by the fact that the theology of the Bible is symbolical rather than dogmatic in character, and that it is on the theology of the Bible rather than on dogmatic theology, whether old or new, that the modern preacher nourishes his soul and the souls of his hearers. Nor is it to be forgotten that the language of devotion is the language not of dogma but of symbol.

Undoubtedly, the symbol has its place in religion and theology. But we contend that the dogma, despite its limitations and the difficulty of overcoming them, has also its place and uses. We need not stamp the legend of the Preacher upon the dogmatic effort and declare it vanity. The consideration that language, and more especially the language of logical thought, is an inadequate vehicle of spiritual truth may be pressed too far. It is to anticipate by a little what follows, but let me at this point summon a distinguished contemporary scientist to the support of the dogmatician: 'Progress in truth,' says Dr. A. N. Whitehead, '—truth of science and truth of religion—is mainly

a progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality.'

THE JUSTIFICATION OF DOGMA.

Let us now pass from the consideration of the limitations of dogma, of which the distinction between dogma and spirit is a reminder, to the consideration of its uses; in other words, let us consider the question of the justification of dogma.

In the first place, a dogmatic theology may exercise a *regulative* function. The reduction of religious ideas and impressions to terms of logical and rational thought serves to check the flights and fantasies of an over-wrought emotionalism, to restrain the outbursts of extravagant fanaticism, of blind enthusiasm. Yet this is not said in wholesale disparagement of those who have been collectively named the 'School of the Spirit,'—of Montanists, Anabaptists, Quakers, the followers of Swedenborg or Edward Irving, and all who claim possession of the 'inner light,' whereby truths latent in the historical revelation, or truths unrevealed in it, are discovered to their hearts and minds. We have learned in this modern time, through Schleiermacher and his successors, how very important in theology is the subjective factor; indeed we have learned it so well that our theology actually tends nowadays to be subjective and narrowly empirical. Whence such a reaction as is discernible in Switzerland and Germany at the present hour, in the Neo-Calvinistic movement led by Karl Barth, Gogarten, and others.

In the second place, besides exercising a regulative and controlling function, a dogmatic theology possesses an *educative* value, as formulating spiritual truth in terms of the common life, and so offering to the 'natural man' some points of contact with the deepest religious experience. Without a dogmatic theology it would be difficult, in any society that has risen well above the stage of primitive culture, to secure continuity of religious custom and belief. The beginnings of Christian dogma were, in fact, largely due to the necessity, or at any rate desirability, of providing a formal creed or confession of faith for converts before baptism, such as was originally the so-called Apostles' Creed.

In the third place, a dogmatic theology serves also an *apologetic* end, as expounding, or rather when it expounds, the fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith in the light of, and with reference

to, modern thought and knowledge. In so doing, it helps to vindicate Christian truth against scepticism and unbelief. Indeed I often think that the best defence of our religion is the positive and precise statement of it, such as the dogmatic attempts to give. Is it not significant in this connexion that our text-books of Christian Apologetics usually contain little that may not be found in a good text-book on Christian Dogmatics? The usual modern Prolegomena to Dogmatics, namely, discussions of the Nature and Truth of Religion, and of the Nature and Truth of Christianity, virtually comprise all that is included in the discipline of Apologetics.

But in the fourth place, the best justification of a dogmatic theology is simply this: as rational beings we try to set forth our deepest thoughts and experiences in the logical terms of reason. 'Human nature,' it has been said, 'craves to be both religious and rational.' And though we may not hope, as already allowed, to present the universe of religion within the limits of a dogmatic exposition, we should not lightly give up the attempt. Even Herbert Spencer, for all his agnostic philosophy, admitted that the sphere occupied by religious creeds (which form the climax of the dogmatic activity) could never become an 'unfilled sphere'; and in the well-known conclusion to his *Autobiography* he confesses to a sympathy with religious creeds based on community of need, feeling—as he says—that dissent from them results from inability to accept the solutions offered joined with the wish that solutions could be found.

It reminds us of Dr. Edward Caird's picture of men 'whose very life is in religious ideas,' but who, for want of a convincing dogmatic presentation or embodiment of them, 'dwell, as it were, in a world of eclipse and paralysis, neither able to find a faith nor to do without one'; and of Sir Henry Jones's characteristic comment, reflecting the buoyancy of his own confidence in reason, that such men have not discovered that 'the experience which condemns the creeds contains the elements, were they but comprehended, of a better faith.'

It was also a far different attitude from Herbert Spencer's that Bushnell adopted. Approaching the great doctrines of the Church in the fulness of vital conviction, he declared himself ready to accept all the creeds and confessions that might be set before him—for the sake of the truths which they struggle to express, and in expectation of a time when language shall be so perfected as to mirror forth in universal symbolism the universal truth of God. Be that as it may, it would appear

that dogma is sure of its place in the effort of human thought, mysterious and profound as are the truths of religion, shallow and hard the forms into which they must needs be cast.

Professor Flint used to tell his students in Edinburgh University that the main part of their work at the Divinity Hall should be to arrive at a system of dogmatic theology. They were not justified, he said, in setting up as religious teachers or preachers if they possessed only superficial, disconnected, discordant, and fragmentary religious impressions and ideas. It seems to me that Professor Flint was in the right, unpopular as such a contention may be at this juncture. The Christian preacher should be the last to claim what George Eliot once whimsically called 'the right of the individual to general haziness.' The Christian religion may indeed, as Professor Flint's distinguished successor has remarked, continue to do its work of reconciliation and renewal in despite of a chaos of crude or questionable theology, but it can hardly be gainsaid that the Christian preacher should have as firm a grasp as possible of theological truth, not merely in its parts, but also as a whole. I do not say that his preaching should usually be dogmatic, *i.e.* doctrinal, in form or even in matter; what I say is that it should be securely based, wherever possible, upon a coherent and consistent interpretation of religious faith and experience. Otherwise, it cannot but lose in power and convincing quality. And so, to borrow a metaphor, I would ask the young preacher to regard his theology not as so much deck cargo to be jettisoned when the ship puts out to sea, but as the ballast which steadies the ship in the stormy weather.

THE AUTHORITY OF DOGMA.

So far the limitations and the uses or justification of dogma, and now some remarks on the authority of dogma. Till now I have been using the word 'dogma' in the somewhat narrow sense of formulated conviction regarding the Christian religion, but it is not the narrowest sense of the word. Dogma commonly carries with it the notion of churchly authority. If the function of authority is to bear witness to spiritual experience, then we need have no quarrel with the *potestas dogmatica* of the Church. But if the function of authority is to compel assent or to override reason, then we may hardly avoid a quarrel with it.

It may not have been altogether clear at the Reformation, but it is abundantly clear now, that the spirit of submission to ecclesiastical doctrine

as such is alien to the true genius of Protestantism. What Dr. Rendel Harris has remarked apropos of the dispute between the traditionalist and the historian is also applicable to the clash between the principles of authority and freedom: the trouble begins when rights are claimed over the solid ground of truth, merely on the presumption of a prior occupation of the soil, and the hereditary plea as expressed by Caliban:

'This island's mine, by Sycorax my mother.'

Already, indeed, in the Westminster Confession the Church's dogmatic authority is conceived in a moderate sense, being recognized as spiritual rather than legal in form; but modern Protestantism is become still more conscious than was the Protestantism of the Reformation era of the distinction in this context between the spiritual and the legal, and is not inclined to grant the claim of finality, of churchly authority *per se* binding, so commonly made for itself by the dogma or the dogmatic scheme. It is not that, according to modern Protestantism, the deeper principles or values which the creeds were designed to express have changed, but that our conception of them has changed, or is in process of change. Accordingly, dogmatics is to be viewed not as a closed system of thought but as a progressive discipline, and as such liable to revision and restatement with the increase of knowledge. Its authority is the authority, not of its original mental cadres, but of the abiding spiritual truths it enshrines or enwraps. The casket is not to be mistaken for the gem, the shell for the kernel. The image and superscription are not the coin itself.

It must sometimes even be hard for the truth to know itself when couched in logical form. Take, for example, that fundamental principle of the Protestant Church, the doctrine of justification by faith. It is a passionate expression of the unquestionable fact that the best works of man cannot stand the scrutiny of a holy God. All generous minds at least would acknowledge this, but, as Froude remarked, when reduced to formulas of theological pedantry, as it was in the age of the Protestant scholasticism, when technicalized into imputed righteousness, grace resistible and grace irresistible, grace of congruity and grace of con-dignity, the theory becomes dead, dry, infertile, even incredible. What is true to conscience and imaginative feeling is apt to become a stone of stumbling when made into a scheme of salvation.

But, fortunately, the tendency of ecclesiastical doctrine to magnify itself and to usurp the authority

of *religio vitæ* is corrected from time to time. The Christian Church was itself born of the conflict between spirit and dogma; and ever and again in the course of Christian history the self-same conflict has been renewed; and it looks as though in our time the spiritual life which Christ gifted to the world must again throw off the forms in which it has been enwrapped and take to itself fresh form and expression.

Does not Professor Whitehead put the plea for revision and restatement of doctrine in arresting language? Reminding us that by formulation in precise dogmas the simplicity of inspiration disengages itself from particular experience, and may thus be enabled to face the transformations of history, he adds these significant words: 'A system of dogmas may be the ark within which the Church floats safely down the flood-tide of history. But the Church will perish unless it opens its window, and lets out the dove to search for an olive branch. Sometimes even it will do well to disembark on Mount Ararat and build a new altar to the divine Spirit.'

'Creeds pass, rites change, no altar standeth whole.'

And there are signs in plenty that our preachers and theologians hold the free or spiritual conception of dogmatic authority herein implied. Their allegiance, as Bishop Barnes has phrased it, is to a 'living power' and not to a 'coercive mechanism of formula and system.' They realize that doctrinal thought must be subject to change and development with the expanding religious and cultural life of mankind. As my old teacher, Dr. William Hastie, used to declare in his eloquent prophetic way, 'Theology is not so prone as she once was to linger on the confines of the mediæval twilight, nor so hesitant to open her dream-bound eyelids in the fuller light of the new dawn; she hears the wondrous voices that ring in the melodies of the morning, and all nature calling her to larger and clearer vision; she sees all true science and all true history coming to her again and tendering to her faithful service, asking only for the joy of freedom and the one constraint of love.'

Yes, although the new creative spirit has been present and active all through the history of dogma (Mr. R. L. Poole assures us that the life of Christendom was never so confined within the hard shell of its dogmatic system that there was no room left for individual liberty of opinion), yet one has the feeling that we are now entering upon what will prove to be a great and memorable era of reconstruction. In the years lying before us should be

garnered the results of the new history and psychology of religion, of the new literary and historical methods as applied to the study of Church doctrine, of the new knowledge of the universe and of human life and its conditions which the natural sciences have been imparting. The ground will thus be prepared for the new dogmatic constructions, the new theological syntheses, which our age seems to demand. The dove must be sent out to search for an olive branch. A new altar even may have to be built to the divine Spirit.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF DOGMA.

How then shall we characterize the theology of the future? Is it not clear, in the first place, that it will be on comparatively *simple* lines? It is simplification and not further elaboration of dogma that we want. To be truly scientific the new constructive or synthetic effort need not be elaborate. We may be confident, at least, that no modern theologian in his senses would dare, like John Gerhard in the heyday of the Lutheran scholasticism, to construct a dogmatic system in nine quarto volumes! We have learned the lesson impressed by Matthew Arnold on his contemporaries, in words that have long possessed my mind, that the licence of affirmation about God and His proceedings in which the religious world indulge is more and more met by the demand for verification.

One way of simplification that appeals to many is through abandonment so far as possible of speculation, and concentration on the ground of Christian experience. For example, we may 'throw out our minds,' as it has been phrased, towards such a transcendent dogma as that of the pre-existence of Christ, but we should realize that we may only 'throw out our minds' towards it.

In the second place—it is part of the same thought of the simplicity of the new construction—theology will be more and more expounded in the *unsectarian* interest. No doubt there has been in recent years a good deal of what might be termed intra-Christian apologetic, in which traditionalist and modernist, sacramentarian (or shall we say sacramentalist?) and evangelical, maintain as against each other their respective positions. But a school of thought is not a Church; and what I would say under this head is that the Churches are becoming more concerned to discover the things in which they agree than those in which they differ. It is enough to cite in these columns the names of Stockholm and Lausanne. The polemic is being transformed into an eirenic. A wave of toleration

and mutual understanding is passing over us, and in it all our minor differences will be submerged. A few belated voices, no doubt, will uphold the old battle-cries of sectarian strife, but to them our *post bellum* world will not listen.

Said the late Bishop Brent, at the opening of the Lausanne Conference: 'We are living in a world that has lost its way. Religion as summed up in Jesus Christ and His Kingdom can alone hope to rescue it. It must be, as God's voice has warned us from the beginning, and our own experience has tragically confirmed, unified religion.'

In Scotland a great step towards unified religion was taken on 24th May last, when the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church decided with practical unanimity for Church Union. If the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland forecasted truly in his Closing Address, soon after the actual completion of union a movement towards doctrinal reform will be instituted. If and when such a movement is instituted and attains its goal, the restatement of faith which will result will be found to be at once simple and unsectarian.

In the third place, the theology of the future will not only be simple and unsectarian, it will be formulated largely in terms of the *personal*, which is the moral and spiritual, life. In the old dogmatic systems, which rested on the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, the relationship between the divine and the human was conceived in abstract, metaphysical, and legal terms. In the newer formulations and interpretations, which rest upon the modern philosophy deriving from Kant, the relationship between the divine and the human tends to be personalized and so kept nearer to the realities of the religious experience. In the age when Christian theology was founded—to adduce a more definite instance—God was thought of, partly under the influence of Gnosticism and Neo-Platonism, as far separated from the evil material world in which man has his habitation, and only modern reflective thought—so it would appear—enables us to speak of Him with some show of reason as truly a Father of spirits, having His life in and through a world-order and a kingdom of selves. And when all is said, this insistence on the personal in the dogmatic presentation is only a return, if by the way of philosophical reflection, to the Biblical conception of divine and human relationships.

Lastly, the new theological synthesis will be more *Christian*. The distinction and pre-eminence of Christianity is its possession of the historic Christ, and in the remoulding of the traditional

theology the historic Christ will be acknowledged as the heart and centre of the doctrinal system. Towards Him all the rays of spiritual light will be seen to converge ; from Him again all the subsequent light will be seen to radiate. In thus giving the rightful, central place to Him in the system of doctrine we shall learn to mediate between the so-called 'liberalism' which reduces Christianity to the religion of Jesus, and the so-called 'idealism' which sublimates Christianity into a religion about Jesus. Any sound reconstruction of our religion will combine both elements of the historical revelation, namely, the revelation in the Jesus of history, and the revelation in the Christ of experience. This the traditional theology has always done according to its lights ; but while it has faithfully interpreted the Christ of experience, it has been

unsuccessful in presenting within its logical formulas the gracious divine-human figure of the Jesus of history.

For the rest, the recasting of dogma must wait for a time when faith is ardent, when religious experience is intense and vital ; a time of revival, when the Spirit breathes into the dry bones that they may live ; a time of uplift and enthusiasm, when the great tides sweep in from the ocean, to surge and break upon the shore. The time may be nearer than we think. It is our hope and confidence that out of the present travail of the nations there shall yet come forth a new and wondrous life, strong, robust, of elemental energy, which shall fill the whole world, not of religion only, but of literature and of art, of science and philosophy, with new and fresh creations.

The Original Position of Acts xiv. 3.

BY THE REVEREND PROFESSOR J. HUGH MICHAEL, M.A., VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, TORONTO.

ONE cannot read the story of the visit of Paul and Barnabas to Iconium in the opening verses of the fourteenth chapter of Acts without being pulled up by a seeming lack of proper sequence in the thought. V.³ does not come naturally after v.². This is how these two verses run in the R.V. : ' But the Jews that were disobedient stirred up the souls of the Gentiles, and made them evil affected against the brethren. (3) Long time therefore they tarried *there* speaking boldly in the Lord, which bare witness unto the word of his grace, granting signs and wonders to be done by their hands.' V.² does not seem to furnish a natural reason for the long stay described in v.³. If v.³ is in its right place we should have expected it to open with 'yet,' not with 'therefore.' Weymouth, indeed, has 'yet' in his rendering, but there is no authority whatsoever for that reading.

An attempt is made by Knowling (*Expositor's Greek Testament*, vol. ii. p. 302) to show that the seeming inconsequence is not as serious as it appears. 'As the text stands,' he writes, 'it is quite possible to suppose that the effect of the preaching in the synagogue would be twofold, v.² thus answering to the last clause of v.¹, and that the disciples continued to speak boldly, encouraged by success on the one hand, and undeterred by opposi-

tion on the other, the consequence being that the division in the city was still further intensified !' This, doubtless, is a possible interpretation, but it does not succeed in removing the feeling that v.³ was not intended to come immediately after v.². Knowing refers to Blass's view that the aorists, which are rendered 'stirred up' and 'made (them) evil affected' in v.², show that the disaffected Jews actually succeeded in their attempts to influence the Gentiles ; and if we are to read so much into these aorists—and there is no obvious reason for refusing to do so—it is most improbable that the Apostles would have been able to continue their ministry in Iconium.

Many attempts have been made to remove the difficulty presented by the ordinary text :

(a) Ramsay would just eliminate v.³. But merely to remove the verse leaves us wondering where it came from, and how it found its way into the text. Ramsay offers no explanation of its presence. Nor can the solitary argument adduced by him in support of his view that v.³ is an early gloss be regarded as at all convincing. The verse speaks of the Lord 'granting signs and wonders to be done' by the hands of Paul and Barnabas ; but Ramsay holds that the emphasis laid by the historian on the healing of the cripple

at Lystra (to which place the Apostles went after leaving Iconium) implies that no miracles had been performed earlier on the present tour (*Paul the Traveller*, p. 108). But surely if the historian chose to give at length the story of the healing at Lystra, that is no reason for concluding that no miracle had been performed in the cities already visited in South Galatia.

(b) Moffatt in his 'New Translation' places v.³ before v.², remarking in a footnote that he is 'restoring v.³ to what appears to have been its original position between vv.^{1, 2}.' It must be granted that when this change is made the text runs much more smoothly, but one very real objection to Moffatt's solution is that if v.³ is placed before v.², then the statement that Paul and Barnabas spoke 'boldly' in the Lord is unexpected and unexplained, for nothing whatsoever has been said in v.¹ to imply that boldness was called for.

(c) In his excellent Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles in the 'Clarendon Bible,' Blunt suggests that 'perhaps vv.³⁻⁵ may be a more enlarged account of what is only given summarily in v.^{1, 2}' (p. 194). No attempt is made to explain how two distinct accounts of the same events found their way into the narrative. While the suggestion is not by any means an impossible one, it must be admitted that the two paragraphs (namely, vv.^{1, 2} and vv.³⁻⁵ respectively) are not sufficiently alike to make it very probable; and, obviously, if a second account of events in Iconium begins at v.³, this account is a mere tourney, and there is nothing to afford an explanation of the 'therefore' with which it opens, or of the boldness with which the Apostles spoke.

(d) The awkwardness of the ordinary text must have been felt very early, for we find in Codex Bezae and a few other 'Western' authorities an interesting attempt to supply a natural and easy transition from v.² to v.³. In Codex Bezae v.² differs much from the common text, and ends with the words *ὁ δὲ κύριος ἔδωκεν ταχὺ εἰρήνην* ('But the Lord speedily gave peace'). The motive of the "Western" additions in this verse is plainly to overcome the exegetical difficulties of v.³ on the assumption that two stages of persecution, a brief lighter one and another more violent, were separated by a period of 'peace' (Ropes, in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. iii. p. 130). The 'Western' text is so transparent an attempt to remove the difficulties that it cannot possibly be regarded as original. Had it been the original text, it is scarcely conceivable that it would

have been altered into the more difficult 'Neutral' text.

Now, has it ever been suggested—if one may be pardoned for making yet another attempt to solve the problem—that the third verse of chapter 14 has by some accident been transferred to its traditional position from the story of the visit to Pisidian Antioch recorded in chapter 13? It so happens that, whereas the statement of a long stay is felt to be out of place in the account of the visit of Paul and Barnabas to Iconium, such a statement would take its place naturally in the story of their ministry in Pisidian Antioch. It has frequently been remarked that 13⁴⁹ implies a stay of some length in the latter city. 'How long a period of time is covered by v.⁴⁹,' says Ramsay, 'we cannot tell with certainty; but it must be plain to every one that the estimate of the whole residence at Antioch as two to six months is a minimum' (*op. cit.* p. 105).

I would suggest that 14³ stood originally right in the middle of 13⁴⁸. If we place it there we get the following sequence (in the text of the Revised Version): 'And as the Gentiles heard this, they were glad, and glorified the word of God. Long time therefore they tarried *there* speaking boldly in the Lord, which bare witness unto the word of his grace, granting signs and wonders to be done by their hands; and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed.' If it be objected that the pronoun 'they' (referring to the Apostles) comes in somewhat awkwardly after the immediately preceding reference to the Gentiles, it may be said in answer that the awkwardness disappears when the story of the visit to Antioch is read as a whole, for then it becomes obvious that Paul and Barnabas (who are mentioned by name in v.⁴⁸) are the persons who tarried long in the city. It may be stated also that the reference of the pronoun is quite as obvious when the verse is inserted in the middle of 13⁴⁸, as it is when the verse is left in its traditional position.

It need hardly be said that it would be easy for a verse to be transferred by some accident from its original position and placed in a new and false context. A scribe might omit the verse, and later, discovering his error, place it in the margin. A subsequent copyist, failing to recognize its true position, might easily place it in the wrong column.

It will be noticed that the latter part of 13⁴⁸—'and as many as were ordained to eternal life believed'—follows most naturally after 14³, more naturally indeed than after the opening half of 13⁴⁹, for the inserted words provide an explanation

of the faith of the Gentiles: it was the outcome of the bold proclamation of the word by the Apostles, and of the signs and wonders which the Lord granted to be done by their hands.

The mention of 'boldness' is natural in 14³ if it belongs to the story of events in Pisidian Antioch, for in that city boldness was needed. It is interesting to note that the same verb (*παρρησιάζομαι*) is used in 13⁴⁶ and in 14³, and if our placing of the latter verse is right, the repetition of the verb is perhaps intended to show that the same courage that was needed in the initial crisis of the break with the synagogue was required also in the days that followed, when Paul and Barnabas worked among the Gentiles.

A possible, though admittedly slight, corroboration of the hypothesis of this note may be mentioned. In 13⁴⁸ the reading 'the word of the Lord' (R.V. margin) is well attested, and if that is the true text, one would hardly expect the identical expression to be repeated almost immediately, as it is in v.⁴⁹. A different expression ('the word of his grace') is used in 14³, and if that verse is inserted in 13⁴⁸, then the two occurrences of the phrase 'the word of the Lord' are separated by a reasonable distance. The reading 'the word of God' in 13⁴⁸ may well be a deliberate attempt to get rid of the awkwardness of having the same phrase twice in such close proximity.

Recent Foreign Theology.

*The Orthodox Church.*¹

It is significant that the only book in English mentioned by Professor Zankow in his bibliography is Professor F. Gavin's volume on 'Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought.' The recent efforts of Heiler and Arseniew to interpret the ethos of the Greek Church have not been accompanied by any corresponding attempt in Britain. This makes Dr. Zankow's book all the more useful. It consists of six lectures, delivered at the University of Berlin, and as the author is a Professor at Sofia University, he is able, from inside knowledge, to dispel a number of misunderstandings about the Eastern Church. In the main he employs material from the confessions and theologians, but not exclusively. Thus, in discussing the Russian Church, he does not forget novelists like Gogol and Dostoevsky.

The Orthodox Church, he begins by showing, is not an autocratic body like the Latin Church of the West, but a federation of nearly twenty autonomous churches. It is called 'Orthodox' because it insists on correct belief rather than on correct doctrine, and its belief is expressed fundamentally in the true praise of God, *i.e.* in the service of God, and in living according to His will. 'The Orthodox Church is, and is determined to remain, the old Church, the Church of the Apostles and the great Church Fathers, the Church of the early Christian

age, of the age of the œcumenical councils and the undivided general Church; it believes itself to have been and to remain the direct heir and the true guardian of this ancient, holy Church.'

As the essence of the orthodox faith lies in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, Dr. Zankow starts with an estimate of the Creed; then comes the subject of the Church, the cultus, and the inner piety and activity of the various communions. He concludes by an interesting and candid comparison of his Church with the Roman and the Protestant. The Orthodox and the Protestant communions, he suggests, have several points in common; *e.g.* their valuation of Scripture, their abjuring of the doctrine of 'merits,' and their supreme exaltation of the Lord Jesus Christ. 'The teaching and the life of the Orthodox Church is wholly Christocentric.' One remark is significant, however. The Orthodox, he thinks, preserve the idea of fellowship and unity in Christ by means of a life of love, whereas Protestantism emphasizes the idea of subjective personality unduly, as the Roman Church stresses unfairly the idea of collective absolutism (culminating in the papacy). Professor Zankow is concerned for the unity of Christendom, and writes in a genuinely irenic spirit, without claiming all good for his own communion; but he frankly recognizes that union with Rome is out of the question, in view of the doctrinal novelties introduced by the Latin mediæval Church. Still, though Peter denied Christ, he repented! 'Who knows whether present-day Christian Rome may

¹ *Das Orthodoxe Christentum des Ostens*, by Stéfan Zankow (Furche-Verlag, Berlin. Pp. 148; RM.6).

not come to follow, in this, the Apostle?' In Protestantism, Dr. Zankow argues, there are special affinities between the Lutheran and the Anglican Churches (which he groups rather hastily together) and the Orthodox, and he is not unhopeful of good emerging from the recent movements towards a better understanding. At the present day it seems there are two parties in the Orthodox Church—one maintaining the old position that all outside the Communion are outside the true Church, the other refusing to believe that the historical non-Orthodox Churches are outside the pale (p. 74 f.).

There are specially helpful explanations of the cultus and its mystical symbolism ('the liturgy is a symbolic representation of the life of Christ and of the holy drama of the sacrifice on Golgotha, and at the same time the supreme mystery of the ever-repeated return of Christ to His own, and His true, inward union with them'), of the doctrine of sin, and of the pre-eminence of humility and love in the ethos of the Church. A series of footnotes amplifies the text, with copious references to other literature. This makes the book a capital manual. There is no recent book so stimulating and reliable on the topic of the Eastern Church, and Dr. Zankow is to be congratulated on his effort to give European sympathizers a glimpse into the principles on which the Orthodox Church bases its historic claims. There is less about missions than we might have expected, but otherwise the conspectus is adequate.

Luther and the State.¹

Professor Holstein of Greifswald University belongs to the Law Faculty, not to the Theological, and his equipment enables him to approach the subject of Luther's views of the State with special acuteness. He is concerned to uphold Luther's estimate as essentially healthy because it is religious, and will not hear of a Swiss theologian like Barth daring to claim Luther as an advocate of any theory which would separate him from the conceptions of the State in German idealism. The State for Luther was indeed conceived in an inadequate patriarchal scheme, owing to the exigencies of the hour, but Dr. Holstein claims that the essential principles of Luther's view are inherited by German philosophical idealism at its best. Luther took a conservative and even passive attitude towards the

State-organization, but he held to the State as one of the natural formations which were ordained by God; and Dr. Holstein traces the working of this view in writers like Hegel and Schleiermacher; he even compares Bismarck's attitude towards social reform with the spirit of Luther's position. The 'absolutism' of Germany, he urges, was not that of France, nor of the Stuarts in England. The moral instinct which breathed in Luther's view of authority, and which marked an advance on mediævalism, kept the Germans from falling into the antithesis between Absolutism and radical democracy; Germany never produced a Hobbes or a Rousseau! In short, it was because Luther took such a profoundly religious view of the State that his theories were able to transform themselves in later philosophy and political economy. An ampler examination of the relation of Church and State would have added to Dr. Holstein's argument, for, as Kattenbusch has recently brought out, Luther really viewed the 'Communio Sanctorum' as both invisible and visible—visible in the organized congregations which, with the family and the State, formed three hierarchies, where perfection was reached as the ideals of the 'Communio Sanctorum' were realized. But the Greifswald Professor makes his points sharply and independently. It is an essay to be read alongside of works like those by Jordan and Holl. There are almost as many pages of notes in small print as of the original text, and these enable the student to follow up the author's trenchant plea as a German publicist.

Celibacy in the Early Church.²

Professor Karl Müller's tract does not go into such detail as the larger work which Herbert Preisker has recently written on 'Christianity and Marriage during the First Three Centuries,' but presents a compact estimate of the problem. He investigates the reasons for a religious cult of celibacy in the primitive Churches. Not only eschatological but dualistic reasons are to be found; in the Pastoral Epistles a Gnostic movement had to be met which forbade marriage as a hindrance to the highest spiritual life, and, as Rev 14¹⁻⁵ shows, the unhealthy passion for celibacy had spread in some circles of the Asiatic Church. Dr. Müller notes further indications, notably in the uncanonical Acts; a man like Aphraates in the Edessene Church as well as the Marcionites confined the

¹ *Luther und die Deutsche Staatsidee*, by Günther Holstein (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [in the series of essays entitled 'Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart.']) M.1.50).

² *Ehelosigkeit aller Getauften in der Alten Kirche*, by Karl Müller (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. M.1.50).

sacraments to celibates. Luckily better counsels prevailed; otherwise, the Christian Church might have become, like the Buddhist community, essentially a group of monks. As he points out, the Messalians and the Euchites from Mesopotamia were simply a continuation of the brothers and sisters described in the pseudo-Clementine *De Virginitate*. The Western Church threw off this ultra-ascetic tendency, which finally was confined to monks.

Koridethi text; Lk 6¹⁻⁹ from D; Mk 1¹⁻⁸ and 3¹³⁻³⁰ from W; Mt 13³¹⁻⁴⁶ from Codex Bezae Cantabrigiae, and a threefold Latin text of Heb 10, besides the capitulation of Codex Fuldensis on Romans. There are sixteen selections in all, clearly printed. The book will enable students to get into touch with their materials at first-hand, and ought to prove a serviceable manual for beginners.

Worship in the Primitive Church.¹

Dr. Duhm's tract, which, like Professor Müller's, belongs to the 'Sammlung Gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte,' begins by noting the difficulty of securing evidence for primitive worship, since customs varied and no writing on the subject was composed until a later date—though the Didache is a partial exception. He distinguishes two services, one of preaching the Word and the other of eucharistic character, describes the prayers, the music, and the incipient liturgy of the communities, and concludes by referring to the recent hypothesis of Lietzmann and Wetter. The core of worship, he agrees, was belief in the presence of Christ. And the cultus preceded the origin of the New Testament writings, though it is partly from the latter that we can argue back to the liturgical practices of the first communities. He does not note that, whether or not Ph 2⁶⁻¹¹ is a eucharistic hymn, 1 Ti 3¹⁶ shows that the primitive confession of faith was in hymnal form. It is a fresh, vital treatment of the subject.

Greek and Roman Religion.³

In the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Lesebuch,' edited by Bertholet, second and enlarged editions have appeared of Professor Martin Nilsson's *Die Religion der Griechen* and of Kurt Latte's *Die Religion der Römer und der Synkretismus der Kaiserzeit*. Each volume contains German versions of the more important sources, carefully arranged, with a few notes at the foot of the page. The materials include inscriptions as well as prose and poetry. Latte's volume comes down as late as Julian and Gratian. Both books are good specimens of the source-book class; the editors have selected their materials well, and have paid proper attention to popular religion in its characteristic forms.

New Testament Textual Criticism.²

Dr. H. J. Vogels, Professor at Bonn, who has written already a manual upon the textual criticism of the New Testament, provides in this small book a convenient selection of material for students who are being initiated into the subject. It is intended for practical use in the class-room. We have, for example, a reprint of Jude from the Codex Vaticanus, the Codex Sinaiticus, and C; Lk 18²⁵⁻³⁴ from the

Calling Jesus 'Lord.'⁴

A Norwegian scholar, Professor Frøvig, writes a sound, cautious monograph on what is implied in the New Testament conception of *Kύριος* as applied to Jesus. He starts by noting the common phrase about 'the impression made by Jesus.' What does this mean, as used by Harnack, Bousset, Wellhausen, and others? Analyse it, Dr. Frøvig declares, and it discloses an authority in Jesus, a consciousness of Divine vocation. He proceeds to review the New Testament evidence for this, setting aside the theory that the Lordship is no more than a Christian adaptation of religious views already current in the mystery religions, and patiently refuting Drews. Jesus was a real man, whose life and death were the historical ground for the application of 'Lord' to Him by the primitive Churches. Incidentally, Dr. Frøvig (p. 60 f.) at

¹ *Der Gottesdienst im Ältesten Christenthum*, by Andreas Duhm (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. M.1.80).

² *Übungsbuch zur Einführung in die Textgeschichte des Neuen Testaments*, by H. J. Vogels (Bonn: Verlag von Peter Hanstein; M.1.20).

³ *Die Religion der Griechen*, by M. P. Nilsson (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. M.4.50); *Die Religion der Römer und der Synkretismus der Kaiserzeit*, by K. Latte (Mohr. M.4.30).

⁴ *Der Kyriosglaube des Neuen Testaments*, by D. A. Frøvig (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. M.3.50).

this point agrees with those who believe that in 2 Co 5¹⁶ Paul meant a personal knowledge of Jesus on earth; he had indeed 'known Christ according to the flesh.' True, this raises a difficulty, for the Apostle goes on to say, 'Henceforth know we him no more,' but this phrase must be understood *cum grano salis*. The invocation of Jesus in prayer (2 Co 12^{7f}, etc.) is taken as a further proof that He was recognized by Paul and others as the Divine Lord; Frövig thinks, as against Bousset, that this title was Palestinian, and that one echo of it is the Aramaic 'Marana.' His main thesis, argued persistently against critics like Bultmann and Bousset, is that the consciousness of a saving mission, in terms of Messianic hopes, is the sole explanation of the life of Jesus, and that out of this the title 'Lord' inevitably arose. One special merit of the monograph is that it does not leave the title *Kύριος* in the air, as so many theories do; Dr. Frövig realizes that, as applied to Jesus, this appellation involves much more historical reality and religious content than the syncretistic hypotheses allow.

Dr. Lohmeyer's essay¹ is one of the most brilliant and stimulating contributions to the discussion of the same topic that have been made for long. No German writing to-day in the field of New Testament criticism reminds us so much of Gunkel as Lohmeyer; he has an original mind and, what is still more important, the sense that he has to deal with religion when he is handling primitive Christian records. The present essay professes to be a study of Ph 2⁵⁻¹¹, but in reality it opens up the entire question of the primitive faith in Jesus Christ, the origin and interconnexion of titles like 'Lord,' 'Logos,' and 'Spirit,' and the various conceptions of the death of Christ in the early Church. So rich and provocative a study cannot be discussed in detail here. All that can be done is to indicate some of its main contentions. Ph 2⁵⁻¹¹ is regarded as a pre-Pauline hymn, probably sung at the Eucharist; it is a psalm of the *Kύριος*, hailing Him as Lord of the cosmos rather than of the Church, a 'carmen Christi,' such as Pliny afterwards found in the Bithynian churches, a strophic piece of adoration which contains Christian recognition of the Divine Jesus in a form which anticipated the Pauline and the Johannine. The argument is worked out with amazing ingenuity. Lohmeyer does not convince us that such an outburst could not have been composed by the Apostle,

however; why assume that he could not for once have used *ἐπερύψωσεν* in this sense, and why should 'even the death of the cross' be a Pauline insertion? Lohmeyer shows that the latter words do not fit into the strophic rhythm, but it is possible to run rhythm too far. Also, while the minute analysis of the Greek terms, even of words like *διό* and *ὥς* is admirably done, is there not a danger of pressing unduly this method in the case of a lyrical outburst such as Lohmeyer takes the passage to be? More serious is the difficulty of establishing a nexus between the 'hymn' and what precedes. Lohmeyer twits commentators for trying to make out an ethical tie between vv. 1-4 and 5^f, but he does not succeed himself in showing how the hymn, as he reads it, fits in to the context at all. He is reduced to the desperate expedient of denying that *ὁ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* goes with what precedes; for him it is 'a sort of formula of citation' (p. 13). This is one of the weak links in his chain of proof. But once he gets into the exegesis of the hymn, he becomes more plausible. By taking it as a piece of pre-Pauline hymnology, he is able to detach it from the Pauline theology, and to suggest some independent interpretations of the text. Behind the opening word, for example, he hears the echo of a cosmogonic myth of creation in which the Lord was tempted, like the Persian Ahriman, to assert his claim to the Divine *δόξα*. The words about becoming a servant (*δοῦλος*) refer to the servant of Yahweh conception of Is 53; *ὡς ἄνθρωπος* is, like the *sicut homo* of Fourth Esdras or the *ὁμοιος υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου* (of Rev 1¹³), an echo of the Aramaic '*Kbarnasch*, for it denotes the historical personality of Jesus as the Divine Messenger, who descended into the realm of death in the fulfilment of His mission.

Here, then, Lohmeyer concludes, we have an early Christian singing what John afterwards wrote, 'We have seen his glory,' and singing with a faith in which the 'Servant of Yahweh' and the 'Son of Man' conceptions were already united. Lohmeyer denies sharply that the term 'Lord' required Hellenistic soil in order to grow for the Church; in the light of the eighth Psalm the title is quite explicable on Jewish presuppositions; and the essay concludes with an acute comparison of the theology of the Epistle to the Hebrews with the theology implied in Ph 2⁵⁻¹¹. It has not been possible in this notice to do more than indicate some of the lines drawn in this remarkable essay, but enough has been said to show that Lohmeyer's position will have to be reckoned with. One admirable trait of his work is that he never suggests that the primitive Christian belief in Jesus as Lord can be

¹ *Kyrios Jesus*, by Ernst Lohmeyer (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung. RM.4.80).

understood by parsing and paring away some texts; he realizes that a vital, original movement of religious faith was flowing through the Churches, and that this was not started by an excited enthusiast in Palestine, nor by any syncretistic eddy after his death.

Herr Michaelis¹ is more concerned with the Kingdom than with the Lord. He is a thorough-going eschatologist; it is not common nowadays to read pages which are so drenched in the eschatological interpretation of the Gospels. Jesus, he argues, carried on the message of John the Baptist; indeed, Jesus in His lifetime uttered the promise which is attributed to Him after the Resurrection in Ac 1⁶ and 11¹⁶—He predicted baptism by the Spirit. Why, then, was this left out of the gospel tradition? Because while Jesus fully expected His death and immediate return at the end of the world, when this promise would be fulfilled, the Resurrection and Pentecost took the Church aback; the Spirit was now unexpectedly given; instead of the catastrophic end of the world, this outpouring of the Spirit was experienced. What the baptism of the Spirit was ever meant to denote, on the eschatological view, the author does not clearly explain. He seems to assume that if Jesus uttered the same words as John the Baptist, He must have meant substantially the same thing. But he insists that Jesus did utter the word about the founding of the Church, as the nucleus for the Divine community at the crisis. When Easter and Pentecost upset the eschatological programme, the Church became a fellowship around the living Christ, instead of having to wait for the Spirit till the final crisis. The author has already chosen his powers of ingenious reconstruction in dealing with the Pauline Epistles, and this monograph gives him the opportunity of some novel experiments. Recently John the Baptist has received much attention; the Mandæan hypotheses seem to some to throw light on this figure, and there is a tendency to prefer even the words of Josephus to the synoptic traditions. Herr Michaelis is very chary of putting faith in the Mandæans, and he is by no means so sceptical of the synoptic tradition as Goguel shows himself. But he forces the eschatological note far too strongly, and lands himself in needlessly precarious exegesis. His practical conclusion can be reached along much safer lines.

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¹ *Täufer, Jesus, Urgemeinde; Die Predigt vom Reiche Gottes vor und nach Pfingsten*, by Wilhelm Michaelis (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann. Pp. 142. RM. 4.50).

María.

In a new volume² which constitutes the second half of *Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina*, Gustaf Dalman continues the work for which, by long experience, keen observation, and wide acquaintance with Jewish and other literature, he is so peculiarly well qualified, of interpreting the life of Palestine. This volume deals with spring and summer, and it is hardly too much to say that every conceivable phase of life and every phenomenon connected with those seasons finds a place in these four hundred and nineteen pages. The habits and occupations of men, the religious festivals, the beasts and birds, the trees and flowers and plants, the weather, the customs connected with every hour of the day and night, everything is here described with a fascination which is never obscured by the very obvious erudition of the writer. At innumerable points the book throws light upon the Bible, but the student of natural history or of folk-lore will find it not one whit less informing than the student of the Bible. Arabic words, sentences, and snatches of songs are plentifully scattered throughout the volume, but always accompanied by translations. We are made to feel how continuous, despite its many vicissitudes, the life of Palestine has been, and how the present is often not only explained by, but identical with, the past.

Three little volumes have recently been added to the series edited by Bertholet dealing with the religions of the world—one on Egypt, another on Vedism and Brahmanism, the last on the older Buddhism.³ This series does not discuss the religions with which it deals, but it performs the invaluable service of furnishing us with well-translated texts of the original sources themselves, without which all discussion is more or less in the air. By the aid of these books the least scholarly reader can secure a first-hand acquaintance with the documents in which those religions expressed themselves and on which their subsequent developments were founded. All the volumes rest on accurate scholarship in difficult and unfamiliar fields, and brief notes are added where necessary. The religious texts in the volume on Egypt, which represent all periods, deal with the cult, the relation

² Verlag von C. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh. M.24.

³ *Ägypten*, by Professor Hermann Kees (M.2.80); *Vedismus und Brahmanismus*, by Professor K. F. Geldner (M.8); *Der Ältere Buddhismus*, by Professor M. Winternitz (M.7.50). (Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen.)

of man to God, conceptions of the future, etc., and the cults and beliefs at the various religious centres are so arranged as to lend themselves to ready comparison. The volume by Geldner gives copious extracts from the literature of ancient India, illustrative of its religious faith, cult, ethics, and speculation. It is no disparagement to these two educative volumes to say that probably the average reader will be more attracted by the volume on Buddhism. Here, as the brief introduction informs us, we have Buddhism presented in the form which it had attained probably as early as 250 B.C., *i.e.* little over two centuries after the Buddha's death, and there is much which goes back almost certainly to the Buddha himself and his disciples, so that in some of these extracts at least we are in direct contact with one of the greatest religious geniuses of the world. It is a great boon to have, in the very words of the authentic sources, so full and clear a statement of the Buddha's teaching on suffering, its origin, and the way to its annihilation.

The evangelical Church in Germany has much reason, according to Professor Schneider, to be of good cheer. In a brochure¹ he points out that the Roman Catholic Church in Germany is progressively losing more members to Protestantism than the Protestant Church to Catholicism. The Catholic Church knows how to make adroit and sometimes unscrupulous use of statistics, but there is nothing in the statistical facts, properly understood, to excite apprehension. It is true, Schneider admits, that, in point of numbers, the evangelical Church has lost heavily since the war, but what it has lost in numbers it has gained in quality, by being relieved of the 'heathen' elements by which it was permeated and which now constitute a great opportunity for vigorous Home Mission enterprise.

Students of the Septuagint will find Kaminka's discussion of the Minor Prophets² full of suggestion and light. In it he argues that the translators of these books were scholarly laymen who, however, were unacquainted with the Hebrew text of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, the Psalms, and even the Pentateuch, from which it follows that in Alexandria already before the middle of the second century B.C. the Torah was no longer read in

Hebrew in the synagogues. For these assertions proof in abundance is offered: for example, the words and phrases of the very similar passages Is 2²⁻⁴ and Mic 4¹⁻³ are often translated quite differently (for example, חֲרֹבוֹת, Mic ῥομφαίας, Is μαχαίρας); while the key to some of the words and phrases which puzzled the translators of the Minor Prophets lay to hand in the Pentateuch, had they known it (for example, the rendering of Mic 2¹, יֵשׁ לְאֵל יִרְיָ, οὐκ ἦσαν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν betrays ignorance of Gn 31²⁹, יֵשׁ לְאֵל יִרְיָ, יִשְׁחָדֵי הָיִל לְמוֹנִי). Incidentally he argues against Wutz's theory that the LXX translation was made from a transliteration in Greek letters of the Hebrew text, pointing out that the very frequent confusion of ר and ר points infallibly to a Hebrew original (cf. Am 3^{10f}, 6⁸, אֲרִמְנוֹת, χῶραι=אֲרָמוֹת). But the most suggestive part of the discussion is that in which he argues that the deviations of LXX from MT, which have often been held to point either to a differing Hebrew text or to ignorance of Hebrew on the part of the translators, are frequently deliberate and represent an early exegetical tradition of which there are later confirmations in the Talmud; the extraordinary translation, for example, of Jg 1^{10b}, where רָכֶב (chariots) appears as 'Ρῆχαβ is to be thus explained. In this way there is seen to be a real affiliation between Palestinian and Alexandrian exegesis. Sometimes, too, where the classical Hebrew was unintelligible to the translators, they cut the knot by renderings based on similar words in vulgar Hebrew or Aramaic, with both of which they were familiar. Curiously enough, they seem to have avoided metaphors drawn from agricultural life; was this due to a certain contempt of the Alexandrian intelligentsia for the fellaheen? This discussion is a real contribution to the problem of the Septuagint.

The last number of the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*³ has four leading articles. One, by W. F. Albright (in English), deals with the American excavations at Tell-Beit Mirsim (20 kilometres south-west of Hebron), which he identifies with the Biblical Kirjath-sepher (to be pointed, he thinks, כִּרְיָת, סֶפֶר, Scribe-city). Many interesting points are made, of which we select three. (1) 'The new archæological researches seem to compel us to separate the struggle with Jericho, Bethel, and Ai from the rest of the Conquest. Jericho seems to have been destroyed before 1500.' (2) 'There is already a very respectable body of evidence, in

¹ *Die Kirchliche Statistik in ihrer Apologetischen Bedeutung*. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh. M.1.

² Armand Kaminka, *Studien zur Septuaginta an der Hand der zwölf kleinen Prophetenbücher*. (J. Kauffmann Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., Schillerstrasse 19. M.2.)

³ Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann, Giessen. M.4.50.

part quite disregarded hitherto, pointing to a Hebrew conquest of Central Palestine in the latter part of the Patriarchal Age. While this conquest was doubtless much less thorough than the conquest of the Shephelah by Joshua, it was relatively complete. . . . The focus of the Habiru power was in just this region during the Amarna period.'

(3) The excavations 'disprove the old view of Kisters, now maintained especially by Torrey, that there was no real interruption in the history of the Jewish occupation of Southern Palestine at the time of the Exile, and that there was, consequently, no true "Restoration."' A beautifully carved seal on which occurs the word יוכן can be definitely assigned to the year 597 B.C. if, as seems probable, יוכן = Jehoiachin. Albright assigns the fall of Tell-Beit Mirsim to the last Chaldaean invasion, probably about 588 B.C.

The old problem of שבוּ שְׁבוּ, recently investigated by Dietrich, has been subjected to a fresh examination by Eberhard Baumann. He connects שְׁבוּ with שָׁבָה, not with שָׁוָה, and regards both noun and verb, though frequently occurring doubtless in 'captivity' contexts, as words belonging to the 'ethico-juridical' sphere, and really implying arrest or punishment for guilt, with no inherent idea in them of deportation (cf. הִשְׁבִּי in Ex 12²⁹). The שְׁבוּהָ is always due to guilt, and the cancelling of it (שָׁוָה), which is always effected by Jahweh, is often paralleled or accompanied by phrases expressing His compassion or favour. Suggestive as the discussion is, we should have liked to see a treatment of the grammatical problem involved in the use of שָׁוָה.

Horst deals with the doxologies in Amos (4¹³ 5⁸ 9^{5f.}). He explains them in the light of the juridical practice underlying Jos 7^{19ff.}, where Achan is commanded to offer a doxology and confession. The sinner confesses, God is glorified, His power and justice in inflicting the penalty are acknowledged, the blow falls; and there the matter ends, without the sin entailing further consequences. So by these insertions in Amos, the post-exilic community implicitly acknowledges that in the Exile Jahweh's judgment upon them has been executed and they shall have to suffer no more for the sins of the fathers. The doxologies would thus be a bright foil to the pervasive gloom of the book.

In the last article Budde attacks with great energy Obbink's view that the tree of life in Eden was not a forbidden tree, that man had eaten of it, and would continue to remain immune from death so long as he had access to it. Budde argues that the tree of life is no part of the original story, but

a later interpolation, and remains unimpressed by the adherence of Staerk and Ungnad to Obbink's view.

The controversy which has raged over the site of Mount Sinai seems to be settling in favour of the view, suggested by allusions in Hebrew poetry, that it is to be sought among the hills of Edom. This view receives strong confirmation from the skilful argument of Dr. Ditlef Nielsen, *The Site of the Biblical Mount Sinai*,¹ who, as a result of a visit to that region in April 1927, definitely identifies Sinai with Petra, and supports his argument by a comparison of the topography of Petra with features of the Sinaitic landscape which may be legitimately inferred from the Mosaic traditions, and which render the identification of Sinai with any volcanic region unnecessary and, on other grounds, improbable.

Julius Rieger devotes a special discussion to the question of the significance of history for the preaching of Amos and Hosea.² A careful examination of all the references in both prophets to the early history of Israel leads him to the conclusion that, though some of them look as if they betrayed acquaintance with the Elohist, it is more probable that both prophets rest upon oral tradition and not upon either of the prophetic documents that lie behind the Pentateuch: indeed, their attitude to the cult is an implicit protest against the letter (Am 5²⁵) and spirit (Hos 10¹) of J and E. In Hosea no less than in Amos the character of Jahweh is marked by a 'demonic' element. Amos sees Jahweh as the Lord of all nations and of all history. Hosea's gaze is turned rather upon the history of his own people: in him first emerges the idea of 'heathendom.' This may be connected with his view of Jahweh and Israel as husband and wife—marriage is an *exclusive* relationship; and Rieger suggests that, from this point of view, the 'knowledge' of Jahweh on which Hosea insists has a remotely sexual colour, which would only heighten the contrast between the morale of Jahwism and the licence of Baalism. The whole historical career of Israel—Shittim, Adam (Hos 6⁷, Jos 3¹⁶), Gibeah, Gilgal, Jezreel—is one prolonged adultery, because she does not know Jahweh. To both prophets history furnished the material which illustrated the sin of men and the reality of God.

¹ Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig.

² *Die Bedeutung der Geschichte für die Verkündigung des Amos und Hosea*. Töpelmann, Giessen. M.3.75.

A powerful plea for the revival of the Psalter in the services of the evangelic churches of Germany is made by Professor Leopold Cordier.¹ He traces the history of psalm-singing from the time of the Reformation, shows how the impulse given by Luther was strengthened by Calvin, discusses the widespread influence of the Genevan Psalter, and deplores the fact that the modern German Church, though its hymn-book contains versions or adaptations of individual psalms, has been at no pains to recover for her worship the Psalter as a whole. Arguing that there is a virility in the Psalter in marked contrast to the sentimentality of the average hymn, Cordier seeks in this brochure to stir up the evangelic conscience of Germany.

From the pen of a Roman Catholic scholar, Alberto Vaccari, comes an Introduction,² in Latin, to The Psalms, The Song, Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Job, Ecclesiastes, and Wisdom. The introduction is prefaced by a discussion of Hebrew Poetry, and followed by an exegetical study of fifteen Psalms and five passages from the Wisdom Books.

On all these books Vaccari shows a wide acquaintance with the relevant literature, Protestant as well as Catholic, and English as well as French, German, and Italian; and he is thoroughly up to date—he takes into account T. J. Meek's theory of The Song, which connects it with the Tammuz cult, and the bearing of the Teaching of Amen-em-ope upon the problem of Proverbs. The writer naturally lays more stress upon authority and tradition than a Protestant scholar would; for example, the New Testament ascription of Davidic authorship to a psalm is an element to be considered in discussing the value of the titles, and for a similar reason Pss 2 and 110 are undoubtedly 'Messianic'—indeed, six of the psalms treated exegetically are 'Messianic.'

But Vaccari is too well aware of the facts to be a thoroughgoing conservative, and on some points he approximates to the conclusions of more or less radical Protestant scholarship. He regards, for example, Ps 19¹⁻⁶ and 7⁻¹⁴ as two separate psalms (Dürr, in Sellin's *Festschrift*, on the other hand, has recently defended the unity of the psalm). His respect for tradition comes out in his treatment of the question of the real meaning of The Song: in favour of its spiritual sense not only the Jewish and Christian tradition weighs with him, but also

the condemnation by an ecumenical council of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who had maintained the literal sense. He thinks that Pr 22¹⁷⁻²⁴²² and Amen-em-ope both draw from a common source, and that a Hebrew one. He believes in the unity of Ecclesiastes, and he defends the unity of Job by the assumption that the author revised and modified the original form of his book, agreeing with Sellin that the Elihu speeches (32-37) were later added by the author himself with a view to the more complete discussion of the problem. The exegetical studies show that he is well acquainted with the textual difficulties. In Ps 49⁸ he renders אַח, 'alas!' but in 73²⁴ he accepts the traditional פְּבוֹד without discussing the emendation which eliminates the idea of 'glory' from the passage.

On p. 74 read 'minus' for 'mimimus,' on p. 80 'graecis' for 'gaecis,' on p. 124 'tribuatur' for 'tribuuatur.'

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It has often been said that the thought of God is at once the most important question for theology and life, and the least satisfactorily dealt with by theologians. Dr. Schumann in his welcome book³ would still say the same, and for very urgent reasons. The religious situation of to-day, he says at the outset, is a witness and a call. It is a witness to the fact that our modern thought and life, based as they have been for the last hundred years or so upon philosophical presuppositions of a mystical and an idealistic kind according to which nothing is (either God or man), but thinking makes it so, are in decay, confessing themselves to be meaningless, lifeless, and hopeless. And it is a call upon us to restate the Reformation thought of God and to exhibit the reality of God therein given as a prelude to a better and a richer human life.

In the second part of his work Professor Schumann considers at length the attempts of such theologians as Troeltsch and Otto and Barth to avoid the mischief of idealism and its ally mysticism. Neither Troeltsch, however, he finds, with his 'religious Apriori,' nor Otto with his 'Numinal,' secures the concrete and objective reality of God. Barth, with his supposed repudiation of all philosophy, is also found wanting, for his view of the relation of man and God is merely a repetition of the Idealistic view of the relation of time and eternity which even the Barthian paradox cannot hide.

These failures, among others, lead Dr. Schumann to argue in the third part of his treatise that all

¹ *Der deutsche evangelische Liederpsalter, ein vergebliches evangelisches Liedergut.* Töpelmann, Giessen.

² *De Libris Veteris Testamenti : De Libris Didacticis.* Pontificio Instituto Biblico, Rome.

³ *Der Gottesgedanke und der Zerfall der Moderne* (Mohr, Tübingen; 1929, 380 pp. M.16).

idealistic and mystical presuppositions must be definitely given up, after the manner of Rehnke, one of the philosophers of the so-called Griefswald School. In this way evangelical theology will secure its full liberty. If we go to school to Rehnke, and learn that the thinker and his thoughts (inasmuch as thinking is never an activity or a spontaneity) are ultimate data without dependence on each other, then we may truly say that our thought of God (a datum) implies neither our dependence upon God nor God's dependence upon us, or that we are laying violent hands upon the Majesty of God. Our thought of God is not an 'object' conceptually constituted by us, but God Himself, a Person, as conscious Will, and Creator, who has truly manifested Himself to men in Revelation as 'Promissio.' Thus the Christian theologian can rightly say that it is by God coming to us that we become Persons, and not by our own conceptual activity. Thus also can he say that the Church is a Divine institution, a fellowship of persons whom God desires to be with Himself for ever—a far richer thing than the sociological and idealistic idea of the Church championed by Troeltsch and Hirsch. And thus finally can he offer Christianity not as a philosophy, but as Good News of God, and thereby encourage our self-deluded and sad world to take hope again, bewildered as it is by its own brutalizing scientific technique, and befogged by its own futile labours in seeking to determine, by processes of self-comprehension, the nature of reality, the Being and Essence of God.

In these days of attempted theological reconstruction Professor Piper comes forward with a claim to be heard on behalf of that Cinderella of disciplines, theological ethics.¹ Acknowledging the great service of Barth in deepening our sense of reality, Dr. Piper considers that the time is due to elaborate (Barth notwithstanding) the ontological and epistemological significance of this sense, an elaboration, which, in its revival of the New Testament and Lutheran thoughts of man in his helpless, fallen state, and of God in His redeeming revelation within the world, not only exhibits reality to be a much more complex, chaotic, and sin-ridden thing than the rationalistic optimism of Idealism had led us to believe, but establishes the right and speciality of theological ethics.

In the first part of his book Professor Piper deals with the question why it is that we acknowledge

the claim of the Divine Law. The answer is found in the understanding of the characteristics and capacities of the human Ego, which as the 'noetic' Ego (in contradistinction to the vegetative, emotional, rational, or volitional Ego) is the specific subject of faith. Evangelical faith is an act of this Ego, certain indeed of its salvation, but shot through with sadness because of earthly imperfections. Hence repentance is a constituent element of all evangelical faith, and Professor Piper indicates at length what this repentance is. Believing repentance arises from the structure of reality, existing because God's creation is grievously vitiated by objective evil powers and human sin, yet hopeful of the re-establishment of God's purpose because of our certainty of salvation in our likeness and accountability to God and in His judgment and redemption in the world.

In the second part the author proceeds to a consideration of the source of evangelical ethics. The discussion here gathers about such questions as the revelation of the Divine Law, its significance, its function, its content, and its fulfilment by faith in the concrete situation of the believer. For there is a law, because the characteristic of the Christian believer is not only that he is certain of salvation. His inner revelation has its counterpart in an exterior revelation which confronts him as at once the demonstration or exemplification of his redemption and as the demand of God that he should seek the things of God, that is, personal sanctification and the world's redemption. The ethical for the believer is thus more than 'ethical' in the strict sense; it includes the whole conscious relationship of the believer in his psycho-social and spiritual natures. The question which theological ethics as a science seeks to answer is, 'What does the revealed law signify for my action, what principles of action may this law have for me in my concrete situation as a believer within the historical evangelical fellowship?'

As a contribution to 'Neo-Orthodoxy' this first volume of Professor Piper is of considerable interest and value. Its intention is not polemic, but eirenic, in the hope that it may help to terminate the days of positive and liberal theology and the confessional antagonisms within Protestantism. The book is subtle, too subtle for reality, and sometimes mythological. It is somewhat unfortunate in its attempted revivals of Pauline demonology, and it does not seem to face up to the question whether or not an objective principle of evil is a contradictory conception. Whether the youth to whom the author offers his work will make use of it

¹ *Die Grundlagen der evangelischen Ethik*, von Professor O. Piper (Bertelsmann, Gütersloh; Bd. i. 1929, 366 pp. M.14).

in their upbuilding of evangelical thought and life remains to be seen, but they will assuredly feel themselves amazingly flattered by Professor Piper's appreciation of their epistemological and ontological genius!

In this excellent booklet¹ Professor Lütgert seeks to indicate the present significance and future fruitful development of the Christian idea of redemption. He gives his exposition historical background by many appreciative references to Paul and Luther, and by much criticism of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, as well as of orthodoxy and of theological writers of the Barthian blend.

The booklet falls into fourteen short sections, and opens with the point that the Christian idea of redemption does not get its specific meaning by starting with something common to all religions, but by asking the following questions about redemption. Redemption from what? to what? and by what? where the answer to the third question alone gives the true answer to the other two. It is Christ who redeems us, redeems us from the world, that is, from death, suffering, sin, and the guilt of sin. In this redemption there are two sides. There is an objective side which is a reconciliation satisfying God's law (in the Pauline-Lutheran sense) in the experience of Christ who as being wholly for God and therefore 'for us' is our reconciliation, redemption, justification, and sanctification. And there is a subjective side which is not simply the removal of our sense of guilt (Ritschl) or the mere overcoming of sin (orthodoxy), but

¹ *Der Erlösungsgedanke in der neueren Theologie*, von Professor W. Lütgert (Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1928, 90 pp. M.2.50).

a restoration of the fellowship of God whose marks are the awakening of prayer, the gift of freedom for the purposes of faith in personal sanctification and in the realizing of the Kingdom of God, and finally the presence of joy. Faith is prayer, faith is reception of God's gift, and therefore Christian redemption cannot be described as a simply psychic process, a species of self-certainty or autonomous activity, or as a mere historical evolution. It is for us and for our world the gift and act of God. Thus it is that all programmes of theistic dualism or of philosophical mysticism are shattered by the Christian idea of redemption, and where the modern man seeks in his need for redemption for an escape from what is to him a tragic existence by union with God, and not for a reconciliation with God out of a consciousness of guilt, he is not to be turned over to the psychiatrist with his method of suppression or to the psychoanalyst with his method of sublimation. He is to be claimed by the Christian pastor, for his is a malady, not of the body or of the mind, but of the soul, which can only redemptively be met by the Good News of God in Christ.

Such are some of the points of a booklet whose texture of thought is very closely woven and decorated with language of real power and beauty. Professor Lütgert's remarks on the relations of faith and redemption to history are open to question as well as his handling of Troeltsch. But this apart, his booklet is quite an education in the development and significance of the Christian idea of redemption, and entirely worthy of translation for the benefit of those whose privilege and duty it is to proclaim the wonder and power of God's redeeming love to needy men and women.

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Contributions and Comments.

Luke xviii. 8.

IN His knowledge that His death was near, Jesus said to the High Priest (Mt 26⁶⁴) that He would return in power to further the advance of God's purpose. He made other references to a return, and these do not appear to bear always on one and the same event. There was to be a final parousia, and several antecedent, e.g. after the Resurrection, in Galilee, at Pentecost, and afterwards. There is a general disposition in Christian thought to

regard the destruction of Jerusalem, the fall of Rome, the Reformation, and such events as special interpositions of God to establish His Kingdom. This verse cannot refer to the final. One direct mark of that return was that the victory of God's purpose would then be complete. Reference to one of a series best fits in with the terms used.

They indicate pain, disappointment, with the state displayed. God had manifestly come at different times, and had not been received (Is 53¹ 65^{1, 2}; Ps 95⁸⁻¹⁰). Jesus' return was to continue

doing as God had done. He might well forecast a like reception when He came. His own past might also intensify the fear. He felt very deeply the nation's rejection of His claims and His message (Mt 23³⁷; Lk 19⁴¹⁻²). The response of the Twelve would not remove the gloom (Jn 5⁴⁰ 6⁶⁷⁻⁷⁰ 14⁹, Mk 9¹⁹ 10³⁵⁻⁴⁵, Lk 22²⁴). The first report of the Resurrection was not believed even by the Apostles. At the destruction of Jerusalem, and at the Reformation, faith was patent in the attitude of some, but how few greeted the event as redemption drawing near. Want of faith was far wider than its presence.

The pain caused by the forecast of how its return would be received is expressed by casting His words in the form of a question. Man's refusal of response to God's efforts on their behalf in the past, and its likely continuance, depressed Christ's soul. Dr. Fosdick says: 'No suffering on earth is more tragic than great love bounded in its disinterestedness.' Dr. Whyte: 'As Christ saw more and more what was in the heart and what came out of the heart of man He seems sometimes inclined to give up His terrible office.' As Dr. Boyd Scott thinks about Christ's feeling caused by His experience of the appalling tenacity of sin in man's heart, he says: 'It was not altogether free from despair.'

Prophets sought to prepare their fellows to meet God when He came. His coming was amid disconcerting events. As there was to be like harassment and dismay at times of Christ's visitation, He would have men ready for the crisis. He says and reiterates how: 'Watch and pray' (Mt 24⁴²⁻⁴⁴ 25¹³, Mk 13³³⁻³⁷, Lk 21³⁴⁻³⁶). Avoid a course that blinds to the unseen, that absorbs energy on material gain or pleasure. Where these absorb the heart, God is disregarded, His value unknown, and so there is no faith. Lk 18¹⁻⁸ gives a needed encouragement to prayer. The prayer spirit one needs in such crisis is not so much petition, as communion, a spirit that seeks to be fit, to be made fit, to follow God, to accept His will and leading. Unpropitious times evoke petition on petition like the widow's. V.7 interjects an assurance that God, the hearer of prayer, is not like the judge to whom the widow addressed her petitions. He is our Father. Christ's experience of the Father in His life on earth was such that He trusted at all times. The storm (Mk 4⁴⁰) ruffled not His calm. He had faith. Ignorance of God filled the disciples with panic. Where is your faith? He asked. He would have men to commune daily with God, in all circumstances. They would thus get to know somewhat, as Christ did fully, that God could be relied on, however

dark His ways. By that sure confidence Christ went unto death in calm faith. The Father was trusted in spite of the experience of being forsaken. This calls on Christians to be sure He is trustworthy, however hidden. Clouds and darkness may be around His ways, but they are paths of truth and love. God can be so known in ordinary experiences, He can be trusted in the sudden unknown. The mode of any of Christ's returns may be as unknowable as its date. It is, perchance, useless to spend time and effort in thought about either. It is wisdom to watch and pray so that we see God and follow Him in ordinary, daily ways. Then we shall not suffer, or cause Him pain at our want of faith when He comes.

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The Four Rivers of Eden.

ONE reads with delight the informative articles of Colonel Stevenson; but has he not misread the *problem* of the rivers of Eden? He conceives the garden to be on the right bank of the Euphrates; one of the four rivers mentioned in the account. For this he has previously given many cogent reasons. He finds these four rivers were all streams which originally flowed into the Persian Gulf. But the problem is hardly that of finding four rivers that ran in the neighbourhood of the Garden, even though there are reminiscent conditions in regard to their characteristic features.

'And a river was going out of Eden, to water the garden; and from thence it separated and became four branches.' As Dr. Driver says: 'The representation gives an idea of the magnitude of the river flowing through the garden: even after leaving it, it could still supply four large streams.'

It is difficult to see in what way it can be held that the Euphrates, after passing Eridu, became four heads, one of which was the River Karun. Whether or no we hold that the Garden site is wholly or partially idealized, it is more than difficult to maintain that four rivers flowing into the Persian Gulf is an adequate explanation of four rivers flowing out of the Garden of Eden.

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Obadiah 7.

In a note on 'Eating the pieces' contributed to the *Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society*, No. xiv., 1929, I have suggested that

l-h-m has sometimes the meaning 'flesh,' which it has in Arabic, and that the expression '*ākal lehem*, like the corresponding expression in Arabic, '*akala lahm*, sometimes means 'to eat the flesh of,' in the sense 'to slander' or 'to be the malicious enemy of.' With reference to this note, my friend Principal A. J. Grieve has reminded me of the passage, Obadiah 7.

R.V. translates this passage: 'All the men of thy confederacy have brought thee on thy way, even to the border: the men that were at peace with thee have deceived thee, and prevailed against thee; *they that eat thy bread* lay a snare under thee: there is none understanding in him.' But the verse is very difficult, and various emendations have been suggested. Some of these are mentioned in *I.C.C.*, *ad loc.*, and need not be repeated here in detail. R.V., it will be noticed, supplies in thought (as indicated by the *italics*) the words 'they that eat' before 'thy bread,' and, as *I.C.C.* notes, it has been suggested that we should actually supply the corresponding Hebrew word '*ōkelē*, translating 'they that eat thy bread.' Another suggestion is that we should take *lahmekā*, usually translated 'thy bread,' to mean here 'thy flesh' = 'thy blood-relations,' comparing the Arabic *luḥmat*. A. B. Ehrlich in *Randglossen*. (1912, vol. v. p. 259) would insert '*ōkelē*, comparing Ps 41¹⁰; but he thinks that here, where the expression concerns not individuals, but peoples, it must be understood to mean peoples befriended by Edom, who had often been his guests and had *eaten bread* with him. Instead of the word translated 'a snare,' *māzōr*, he would read 'strangers,' *zār* or *zārīm*.

Kent (*Sermons, Epistles, and Apocalypses*, 1910, p. 340) translates: 'But to the very border they have driven thee, all thy allies have betrayed thee; thy avowed friends have overpowered thee, they have set a trap for thee.' He omits *lahmekā* with the LXX. But it is a mistake to assume, as commentators so often do, that because a word is not represented in the LXX, it was not found in the Hebrew text. Often when a translator does not understand a word, or thinks it superfluous, he quietly drops it.

I submit that *yākelu* is a misplaced '*ākelu*, and that *leka* is a dittograph of *l-h-m-ka* (to be explained perhaps by Principal I. W. Slotki's theory about faded letters, *JMEOS*, No. xiii. 1927). With Ehrlich, I would read *zār* or *zārīm* for *māzōr*; and would accept the suggestion that '*ēyn lebhūmah bō* at the end of the verse is a marginal gloss. Adopting my interpretation of the expression '*ākel lehem*, the resulting translation will be: 'But to the very

border they have driven thee, all thy allies have betrayed thee; thy avowed friends have become thy malicious enemies' (lit. 'have eaten thy flesh'), 'they have put strangers in thy place.'

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John xx. 17.

λέγει αὐτῇ ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Μὴ μου ἄπτον· οὐπω γὰρ ἀναβέβηκα πρὸς τὸν πατέρα· πορεύου δὲ κτλ. The wonderfully vivid, simple, and touching narrative of this first appearance of the Risen Lord to Mary of Magdala is recorded by John alone. (The allusion to it in Mk 16^{9f.} shows that the writer of the last twelve verses of Mark was aware of the incident, which, it may be noted, is at variance with the narrative of Mark himself, immediately preceding (Mk 16¹⁻⁸), and incidentally is evidence that both narratives cannot have been penned by the same hand.)

Something, however, of its beauty and pathos is lost, I think, in the renderings of A.V. and R.V. The text of the passage, it may be premised, is not altogether certain. Some readings omit the *μὴ* before *ἄπτον*, others, retaining it, omit the preceding *μου*, while another variant for *μὴ μου ἄπτον* reads *μὴ οὐ πτόου*. The weight, however, of MS. authority is all in favour of the retention of *μὴ*. A review of the context and a comparison with parallel passages are necessary to arrive at a clear meaning of the passage.

Mary of Magdala is standing alone, uncertainly, by the empty tomb after the two disciples have left her and returned to Jerusalem. She stoops down and looking into the tomb sees within two ἄγγελοι who question her. She replies, 'They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him.' She had come there with no thought, no expectation of seeing her Lord risen from the dead, only with love's sorrowing tenderness to behold the place where they had laid Him. And the rock-hollowed tomb was empty. His body lay she knew not where. Turning away she saw some one whom in the yet uncertain light she took to be the gardener of the place. Him she questioned about the taking away of the body. One word only He said, but that was enough. She could not forget that well-remembered voice. But as, on His first appearance to them, the disciples 'supposed they saw a spirit' (Lk 24³⁷) and were affrighted, so was it with her. With a startled cry, 'Rabboni!' she recoiled (σπραφέισα, v.¹⁶). Calming her fear, He replied, 'Fear not: touch me

(and see that I am the same "Teacher" thou hast always known); for not yet have I ascended to the Father.'

We read (Mt 28¹⁰), on the first appearance of the Risen Lord to Mary of Magdala and 'the other Mary' He quieted their fears with the words, 'Fear not (μὴ φοβείσθε): go tell my brethren.' So here (v.¹⁷), He bids Mary 'go and tell His brethren.' Again, it is recorded how on His first appearing to the Eleven and 'them that were with them,' giving them His wonted greeting, He added, 'Εγὼ εἰμι, μὴ φοβείσθε (so Lachmann). But they, πτοηθέντες δὲ καὶ ἐμφοβου (terrified and full of fear) ἐδόκουν πνεῦμα θεωρεῖν (Lk 24³⁷). Quieting their fear, ψηλαφήσατε με καὶ ἴδετε (v.¹⁹), 'Handle me and see (that I am no spirit),' He said.

Why, here, in contradiction to Matthew's account αἱ . . . ἐκράτησαν αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας (Mt 28⁹), should He forbid Mary to touch Him, and invite the disciples and others to do so, that they might know it was He Himself indeed who stood before them? Was it not but natural in the circumstances that a sudden thrill of awe and fear should have passed through her? To her, standing there alone in the grey light of dawn, His sudden appearance must surely have seemed even more startling than it did to His disciples when He first revealed Himself to them. How cold and forbidding otherwise would the command, 'Touch me not,' have appeared to that loving heart! He calms her momentary fear. He invites her to make proof that He is no phantasm, but the same Jesus she has known on earth, for He has 'not yet ascended to the Father.'

Retaining the μὴ, which I take here to be elliptical, I would point the passage thus: μὴ (sc. φοβού): μὴ ἄπτον κτλ., 'Nay, be not afraid: touch me . . .'; which is in accordance with parallel passages, and also with the variant reading (*supra*), μὴ οὐ πτόου—a reading which, though unsupported by the great uncials, is at least worthy of consideration.

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Kelso.

Mark xiv. 41: ἀπέχει.

How should this word be translated? Both the A.V. and R.V. render it, 'it is enough.' Most versions render it in a similar way. In the *Ex. Gk. Test.* Dr. A. B. Bruce says it is one of Mark's puzzling words, and, after referring to Beza, Elsmer and Raphel, adds: 'The meaning is, I have conquered in the struggle. I need your sym-

pathy no longer; you may sleep now if you will.' This makes it an ironical word. Ed. König in *H.D.B.* says he does not include the verse among examples of irony. If we accept the rendering 'it is enough,' does it refer to the disciples' sleep, or is it ironical?

But 'it is enough' is not the only way of translating ἀπέχει. In Mt 62.^{5, 16} ἀπέχουσι, is translated 'they have received.' Why, then, should the word not have the same meaning in Mk 14⁴¹? If it does, being singular, the subject would be singular also. The words ἰδοὺ ὁ παραδιδούς in v.⁴² show that Judas was in Jesus' mind, and suggests that ὁ παραδιδούς is the subject of ἀπέχει, and the translation would then be, 'he has received full payment.' In support of this we cite from A. Souter's *Lexicon to the Greek New Test.*, 'I have received (payment) a formula of receipts: so probably also in Mk 14⁴¹ ὁ Ἰούδας being understood as subject.' Mr. H. G. Woods, in Peake's *Commentary*, says De Zwaan has discovered that the word is often used in papyri on receipt forms. It may then refer to Judas, 'He has received (the bribe). He has succumbed to the temptation.'

We would suggest two reasons for adopting this translation. First, Jesus had warned Judas again and again, but in vain. In the garden of Gethsemane He is faced by the prospect of death. Whatever happens now there is no escape. But why should His death be embittered by the betrayal Judas is contemplating? Cannot that cup pass from Him? It was a bitter experience to be rejected by His own nation, but the bitterest of all was that His death was possible through the treachery of one of His friends. So Jesus prays that if possible Judas may draw back from his purpose and not complete his plan. The priests were too subtle to pay Judas till he had completed his work. So when Jesus sees the lights of the party sent to arrest Him, He knows the payment has been made. Judas has succumbed to the temptation. Warnings and prayers alike have failed. Second, in using ἀπέχει Jesus shows His fineness of spirit, His deep sorrow at what has happened, His readiness to spare Judas from the natural anger of the other disciples. It is like the sorrowful utterance of a man speaking to himself. Jesus knows the worst thing He dreaded must be faced, and in sorrow says, more to Himself than to the others, ἀπέχει.

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